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III. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Mr. Hem was given a driver's license suspension as a result of his failure of a breath test on 
April 6, 2013, pursuant to LC.§ 18-8002A. The license suspension began on April 6, 2013, with 
a temporary license being good for thirty days. The hearing was set for May 9, 2013, over the 
objection of Mr. Hem. This is an appeal from the decision of the district court upholding the ALS 
hearing officer's decision to suspend Mr. Hem's license. 
Party Reference: The Idaho Transportation Department is referred to as "ITD" or 
"Department" for the purposes of this argument. Mr. Hern is referred to by name. Idaho State 
Police Forensic Services is referred to as "ISP" or "ISPFS." 
Standard for Review: In Dru/fell v. State Department of Transportation, 136 Id. 853, 41 
P.3d 739 (2002), the Supreme Court set out the standard of review in matters dealing with the 
judicial reviews of administrative proceedings, the Court stated: 
"Under the IDAPA, the ITD's decision may be overturned only where its findings: 
a) violate statutory or constitutional provisions; b) exceed the agency's statutory 
authority; c) or made upon unlawful procedures; d) are not supported by substantial 
evidence in the record; ore) are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. LC. 
Section 67-5279(3). 
At p. 855. See also Idaho Transportation Departmentv. Van Camp, Not Reported in P.3d, 2011 WL 
2086512 (Id. App.) and Elias-Cruz v. Idaho Department of Transportation, 153 Id. 200,280 P.3d 
703 (2012). 
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LC. § 18-8002A(7) sets out the burden of the driver to demonstrate to the Hearing Officer that 
driving privileges should be reinstated. The review of disputed issues of fact must be confined to 
the agency record for judicial review. LC. §67-5277. LC. §67-5279(1) sets out the scope of review. 
Bennettv. State of Idaho, DepartmentofTransportation, 147 Id. 141,206 P.3d 505 (Ct. App. 2009). 
The Court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence 
presented. Upon judicial review of an administrative hearing officer's order a Court may not set 
aside findings unless those findings are "not supported by substantial evidence on the Record as a 
whole" LC. §67-5279(3)(d). Mahurin v. State of Idaho, Department of Transportation, 140 Id. 65, 
99 P.3d 125, (2004). See also Gibbar v. State of Idaho, Department of Transportation, 143 Id. 937, 
155 P.3d 1176, (Ct. App. 2006). 
The appropriate remedy pursuant to the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act is:" ... if the 
agency is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole or in part and remanded for further proceedings 
as necessary." I.C. §67-5279(3). See Gibbar at p. 1181. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that the decision of the Transportation Department must 
be affirmed, unless the order violates statutory or constitutional provisions, exceeds the agency's 
authority, is made upon unlawful procedure, is not supported by substantial evidence, or is arbitrary, 
capricious or an abuse of discretion. Marshall v. Idaho Transportation Department, 137 Id. 337; 
48 P.3d 666 (2002). The party challenging the agency decision must demonstrate that the agency 
erred in a manner specified in LC. §67-5279(3) and that a substantial right of that party has been 
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prejudiced. Gibbar v, State of Idaho, Department a/Transportation, 143 Id. 937, 155 P.3d 1176, 
(Id. App. 2006) and Idaho Transportation Department v. Van Camp, supra. 
A hearing pursuant to LC. § l 8-8002A results in an agency action and is therefor governed 
by the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act. The constitutionality of a statute or administrative 
regulation is a question oflaw over which this court exercises free review. Wanner v. State, 151 Id. 
164,244 P.3d 1250 (2011) at p. 1253. The Idaho Administrative Procedure Act governs the review 
of Department decisions to deny, cancel, suspend, disqualify, revoke or restrict a persons driver's 
license. See LC. §§ 49-330, 67-5270, 49-201, 67-5201(2). Bell v, Idaho Department of 
Transportation, 151 Idaho 659,262 P.3d. 1030 (2011). 
IV. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND COURSE OF PROCEEDING 
Mr. Hem was driving in Lewiston, Idaho, on April 5, 2013, at which time he was stopped 
for making an improper right hand turn by turning from G Street into the second northbound lane 
of 18th Street instead of the closest northbound lane. Clerk's Exhibit 2 R. at pp. 4-5, 
The Trooper acknowledged several mistakes in the course of this DUI contact and 
had acknowledged that this was his first DUI stop. Clerk's Exhibit I Tr. at pp. 11-13. This is why 
the Trooper had a training officer, Trooper Travis Hight, with him. Clerk's Exhibit 1 Tr. at p. 13-14. 
The Trooper noted that Mr. Hern has no slurred speech, no impaired memory, and no glassy 
bloodshot eyes. Clerk's Exhibit 2 R .at p. 5. After the conclusion of the field sobriety tests, Mr. 
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Hem was arrested and transported to the Nez Perce County Jail. A breath test was performed using 
the Intoxilyzer 5000EN. Clerk's Exhibit 2 R. at p. 3. 
The Trooper indicates that he played the CD format of the Notice of Suspension. Clerk's 
Exhibit 1 Tr. at p. 31. The date of the arrest on the Notice of Suspension is 4-5-2013. The date of 
service is 4-6-2013. Clerk's Exhibit 2 R. at p. 1. However, the Trooper indicated that he did not 
actually serve Mr. Hern with the Notice of Suspension nor did he serve him with the citation. These 
documents were simply given to the jail staff. Clerk's Exhibit 1 Tr. at pp. 11-12. 
On the second page of the Notice of Suspension, the language that the ITD put in its notice 
is as follows: 
If you request a hearing, it shall be held within twenty (20) days of the date the 
hearing request was received by the Idaho Transportation Department (Section 18-
8002A, Idaho Code). 
Clerk's Exhibit 2 R. at p. 2. 
A Request for Hearing was generated April 9, 2013, and sent to the Idaho Transportation 
Department of behalf of Mr. Hern. Clerk's Exhibit 2 R. at p. 20. Other documents were also 
forwarded to the Department. Requests for subpoenas for the breath testing specialist, arresting 
officer, log sheets, and video were also made. Clerk's Exhibit 2 R. at p. 27. A Motion for 
Discovery Order was also made. Clerk's Exhibit 2 R. at p. 29. An Objection to Administrative 
Notice was also filed with the Department. Clerk's Exhibit 2 R. at p. 32. Notice of Appearance was 
also filed. Clerk's Exhibit 2 R. at p. 34. A Request for Discovery was filed. Clerk's Exhibit 2 R. 
at p. 36. 
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The Idaho Transportation Department generated documents on April 15, 2013, regarding this 
case, six days after the request for hearing. There is no explanation in the record why the hearing 
officer waited six days. The 9th of April, 2013 was a Tuesday and the 15th of April was a Monday. 
A subpoena was issued to Andrew Schoonmaker noting the hearing was set for May 9, 2013, at 2:00 
p.rn. MST. Clerk's Exhibit 2 R. at p. 52. A subpoena was issued for the video noting that the 
material had to be received by ITD on April 29, 2013. The subpoenaed material had to be sent to 
ITD and not the driver or his counsel even though the subpoena was issued based on the request of 
the driver. Clerk's Exhibit 2 R. at p. 53. An Instrument Log Sheet subpoena was also issued on April 
15, 2013, with a received date of April 29, 2013. Again, the information had to be sent to ITD. 
Clerk's Exhibit 2 R. at p. 55. On April 15, 2013, the hearing officer issued subpoenas for evidence 
he deemed relevant and denied the request for any other subpoenaed information. Clerk's Exhibit 
2 R. atp. 59. 
The Department issued its Notice of Telephone Hearing on April 15, 2013, noting that the 
hearing would be conducted by telephone on May 9, 2013. Clerk's Exhibit 2 R. at p. 93. The 
hearing officer also issued a Show Cause letter which states as follows: 
"The Department received your hearing request in a timely matter and forwarded the 
required documents to the hearing examination section. The hearing examiner has 
extended the hearing date pursuant to I.C. 18-8002A(7), do to: 
(xxx) allow time for the receipt of subpoenaed evidence requested by the Petitioner." 
Clerk's Exhibit 2 R. at p. 94. 
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The Instrument Log Sheet was received by the Department on April 17, 2013. Clerk's 
Exhibit 2 R. at p. 75 and sent to Counsel on April 18, 20103. Clerk's Exhibit 2 R. at p. 109. The 
evidence report was received by the Department on April 19, 2013. Clerk's Exhibit 2 R. at p. 110. 
A notice to the hearing officer was sent indicating that Clark and Feeney had received the log sheets, 
police reports, and video by April 24, 2013. Clerk's Exhibit 2 R. at p. 111. The Affidavit of Service 
for the subpoena of the audio/video notes service on April 16, 2012. Obviously, it should be 2013 
because the notary notes April 17, 2013. Clerk's Exhibit 2 R. at p. 68. 
There is no explanation in this record as to why the hearing officer waited six (6) days to 
issue the subpoenas. The hearing officer did not have a Show Cause Hearing even thought it was 
requested and his decision as to good cause was objected to on this record. Clerk's Exhibit 2 R. at 
p. 63. The hearing was held on May 9, 2013. The hearing officer issued his decision on May 24, 
2013. Clerk's Exhibit 2 R. at pp. 118-139. 
As a result of the hearing, the hearing officer upheld the license suspension. Mr. Hern 
filed a timely request for judicial review. The district court had oral argument on May 14, 2014. A 
decision was filed on June 23, 2014. Clerk's Record at p. 539. A Notice of Appeal was filed on June 
26, 2014. Clerk's Record at p. 549. 
The administrative hearing record is found at Clerk's Exhibit 2 while the ALS hearing 
transcript is found at Clerk's Exhibit 1. 
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V. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. The Standard Operating Procedures for Breath Alcohol Testing Are Not Rules and 
the Agency Action Resting on the Standard Operating Procedures for Breath Alcohol 
Testing must Be Set Aside. 
(A) The Hern and Nauert Decisions 
(B) The Standard Operating Procedures For Breath Alcohol Testing Issued By 
The ISP Lack The Force And Effect Of Law 
(C) There Is No Evidence The Idaho State Police Engaged In Proper Rulemaking 
Procedure In Compliance With IAP A When It Issued The Standard Operating 
Procedures For Breath Alcohol Testing 
II. There was No Due Process in Mr. Hem's ALS Hearings 
III. The Actions of the Hearing Officer Violate Mr. Hem's Equal Protection Rights. 
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VI. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES FOR BREATH ALCOHOL 
TESTING ARE NOT RULES AND THE AGENCY ACTION RESTING ON THE 
STANDARD OPERA TING PROCEDURES FOR BREATH ALCOHOL 
TESTING MUST BE SET ASIDE. 
A. The Hern and Nauert Decisions 
In State v. Hern, Nez Perce County Case No. CV 13-01106, Judge Brudie issued a decision 
regarding the SOP and the requirement for rulemaking. Judge Brudie found as follows: 
"Petitioner Hern contends that, if the SOP's (sic) are not rules, then they are merely 
guidelines, and do not have the full force and effect of law. The Court does not 
disagree with Hem's premises. However, the Court finds the SOP's (sic) are not 
intended by ISP or the legislature to be rules, nor or they intended to have the full 
force and effect of law." 
Hern Opinion R. at p. 544. 
However, the ISPFS and the State of Idaho have, in the past few months, recognized that 
rule-making is required. On September 2, 2014, the State enacted IDAP A Rules for breath testing. 
The Notice of Rulemaking - Temporary and Proposed Rule has for its justification the following: 
"The need for the temporary rule change is due to ongoing criminal cases and appeals 
in the Idaho judicial system to suppress blood alcohol results based on the current 
process of having the rules governing breath alcohol testing in ISP Forensic Services' 
Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) rather than administrative rule. If the breath 
alcohol results are suppressed by the courts because of the current wording, 
DUI cases with breath test results would not be able to be prosecuted in Idaho. 
Not prosecuting DUI cases presents a significant public safety threat." ( emphasis 
added) 
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A copy of the Notice is attached hereto as Exhibit "A". The State ofldaho has specifically 
recognized that without breath testing standards that are properly promulgated, the ISP Forensic 
Services' SOP has no force and effect of law. Dennis Stevenson, the State Administrative Rules 
Coordinator, Department of Administration, in an e-mail sent to Matthew Garnette, who is the head 
of the Forensic Services for ISP, noted as follows: 
"Hello Matthew, Unfortunately. I think Judge Stegner got it right. The SOP manual 
is not an internal management document per se. As the judge pointed, the SOP does 
affect the rules of evidence which, in tum, affect the rights of the public. 
Because the SOP is not incorporated by reference, it does not have the force and 
effect of the law. One of the definitions of a rule is the practice or procedure 
requirements of an agency, and, in this case, these procedures affect the private rights 
of the public or the procedures available to the public and, as such, must be put into 
a rule to be enforceable. 
That's my 2 cents worth. 
Best regards, 
Dennis Stevenson" ( emphasis added) 
A copy of the e-mail generated by Mr. Garnette and Mr. Stevenson is attached to this brief as Exhibit 
"B". The State ofldaho has specifically recognized that Judge Brudie was wrong. The e-mail from 
Dennis Stevenson and Matthew Garnette was received by Counsel pursuant to a Freedom of 
Information Request. 
Attached hereto as Exhibit "C" is a copy of page 1 the House Bill 284 in which the legislature 
chose to add what is now subsection 3 of LC. § l 8-8002A. The legislature noted the reason for the 
amendment: "To provide rulemaking authority of the Department of Law Enforcement ... " The 
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legislature generated a specific and entirely new subsection 3 to LC. § I 8-8002A. In this new 
subsection 3 the legislature added rulemaking pursuant to Chapter 52, Title 67, Idaho Code. The 
current version of§ I 8-8002A replaces Department of Law Enforcement with ISP. Judge Brudie 
determined that the use of the word "may" was intended by the legislature to simply grant ISP 
discretionary authority to promulgate rules regarding breath testing. Judge Brudie stated: "The 
Standards, or the SOP's (sic), are not rules, are not required to be rules, and therefore may not be 
promulgated in accordance with the Administrative Procedures Act." Hern Opinion Rat p. 545. At 
no time did Judge Brudie ask any questions at oral argument regarding the use of the word "may". 
Judge Brudie's decision also does not cite to any case that supports his position that an entire 
paragraph such as LC. § I 8-8002A(3) should be void or null in its effect. The Court in Hern 
disregards the mandatory language found in subsections § I 8-8002A(3)(a) & (b ). 
Judge Brudie' s analysis of LC. § I 8-8002A(3) is contrary to the holding of State v. Swenson, 
156 Idaho 633, 329 P.3d 1081 (Ct. App. 2014): "Idaho Code §§ 18-8004(4) and 18-8002A(3) 
charge the Idaho State Police agency with promulgating rules prescribing standards for 
administration of breath alcohol content tests." At p. I 083. The Courts in State v. Besaw, 155 Idaho 
134,306 P.3d 219 (Ct. App. 2013) and Platz v. State, 154 Idaho 960,303 P.3d 647 (Ct. App. 2013), 
did not imply that there was discretion with regard to the issue of the rulemaking authority pursuant 
to the Administrative Procedures Act. 
The District Court in Hern also fails to note LC. § 18-8002A(l 0): "Rules, the Department 
may adopt rules under the provisions of Chapter 52, Title 64, Idaho Code, deemed necessary to 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 10 
implement the provisions of this section." The legislature uses the word "may". The Court can go 
to IDAPA Rule 39.02.72.000: Legal Authority: "In accordance with §18-8002A, Idaho Code, the 
Idaho Transportation Board adopts the following rule governing administrative license suspension 
( ALS)." ( emphasis added). The Court can compare what ISPFS did with its "rulemaking" in ID AP A 
Rule 11.03.01.000: Legal Authority: "The director of the Idaho State Police has general rulemaking 
authority to prescribe rules and regulations for alcohol testing, pursuant to §67-2901, Idaho Code." 
( emphasis added). This IDAP A rule does not cite to LC. § 18-8002A(3) regarding legal authority. 
The legislature made a specific requirement under §18-8002A(3) for rulemaking. See LC. §67-
52311. ISPFS uses another code section of the Idaho Code that isn't specific to breath testing to try 
to circumvent the legislature's directive. Clearly this failure to comply with the directive of the 
legislature in§ l 8-8002A(3) is in violation of both constitutional and statutory provisions and is in 
excess of the statutory authority oflSP. LC. §67-5279(3).2 Using §67-2901 for rulemaking was 
made upon an unlawful procedure and isn't supported by substantial evidence on the record. Failing 
to comply with § I 8-8002A(3) was arbitrary, capricious, and an abusive discretion on the part of 
ISPFS. 
1 67-5231. INVALIDITY OF RULES NOT ADOPTED IN COMPLIANCE WITH THIS CHAPTER -- TIME LIMITATION. (1) Rules 
may be promulgated by an agency only when specifically authorized by statute. A temporary or final rule adopted and 
becoming effective after July 1, 1993, is voidable unless adopted in substantial compliance with the requirements of this chapter. 
(2) A proceeding, either administrative or judicial, to contest any rule on the ground of noncompliance with the procedural 
requirements of this chapter must be commenced within two (2) years from the effective date of the rule. (emphasis added) 
2 67-5279. SCOPE OF REVIEW--TYPE OF RELIEF ... (3) When the agency was required by the provisions of this chapter or 
by other provisions of law to issue an order, the court shall affirm the agency action unless the court finds that the agency's 
findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: (a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (b) in excess of the 
statutory authority of the agency; (c) made upon unlawful procedure; (d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a 
whole; or (e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. If the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole or in 
part, and remanded for further proceedings as necessary. 
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The Court can begin its analysis with the construction of I.C. § l 8-8002A(3) with cases from 
the 1930s. "Ejusdem Generis must be considered in connection with the rule of construction in that 
effect must be given to all of the words of the statute if possible, so that none will be void, 
superfluous or redundant". In the }vfatter of Winston Lumber Company, 57 Idaho 131, 136, 63 P.2d 
664 (1936). 
The objective of the legislature with regard to the modification of 18-8002A(3) was to 
require the Department of Law Enforcement and now ISPFS, to comply with the rulemaking 
requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act. There can be no other explanation for the 
addition of§ 18-8002A(3 ). The Hern decision circumvents this point by failing to look at the entire 
statute and the purpose behind the statute or the case law dealing with statutory construction. In 
State v. Bunting Tractor Company, 58 Idaho 617, 77 P.2d 464 (1938); in a decision written by 
Justice Ailshie, in which Justice Holden, Justice Givens and Justice Stevens, concurred, the Court 
in interpreting the use of the word "may" in the first sentence of the statute stated: ". . . and 
although the word "may" was used in the first sentence, the word "shall" is used throughout the 
remained of the Act, and if it was not intended to be mandatory, it would render secs. 1510 and 1514 
fully meaningless and ineffectual." Justice Ailshie stated: "For these reasons, I am constrained to 
hold that sec. 65-1507 was intended to be mandatory and is to be read and construed in pari materia 
with sec. 1508." At p. 632. In other words, the Supreme Court determined that one has to read the 
whole statute, not one word, to give the statute its intended effect. 
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In Bonner County v. Cunningham, 323 P.3d 1252 (Idaho App. 2014); the Court noted that 
whether a statute is mandatory or discretionary is to be ascertained from a consideration of the Act, 
its nature, its object and the consequences that would result from construing it one way or the other. 
The Court noted that an interpretation violates the fundamental principle of statutory construction 
if such an interpretation does not give effect to all the words of the statute and renders any part of 
the statute null. See also Carlson v. Mullen, 29 Idaho 795, 162 P.332 (1917). In State v. Nelson, 119 
Idaho 444, 807 P.2d 1282 (Ct.App. 1991), the Court indicated that it was incumbent upon a court 
to give a statute an interpretation that will not render it a nullity. 
Why would the legislature add § 18-8002A(3) if the rulemak:ing authority was already 
available to ISPFS pursuant to I.C.§67-2901. Clearly the legislature would have known that section 
was in existence at the time it enacted LC. §18-8002A(3). In the Matter of Druffel, 136 Idaho 853, 
41 P.3d 739 (2002) the Court found that statutes are construed under the assumption that the 
legislature was aware of all other statutes and legal procedure at the time statute was passed. Druffel 
is a good case for the Court to look at because it specifically dealt with overreaching by a state 
agency. 
Idaho Code § 18-8002A(3) must be interpreted in the context of the entire provision, not just 
one word. Construction of a statute that would lead to an absurd result is disfavored. Clearly, in this 
case, using the word "may" to disregard the entire paragraph of § l 8-8002A(3) would lead to an 
absurd result. See also State of Idaho v. Trusdall, 155 Idaho 965,318 P.3d 955 (Ct.Apps. 2014). 
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The Hern decision is too simplistic in its analysis of§ 18-8002A(3 ). It fails to take into account the 
very reason behind the rulemaking authority, to require science in breath testing. 
The Court can next review the very fine decision of Judge Stegner in State v. Nauert, 
Kootenai County Case No. CR 2013-10176. A copy of Judge Stegner' s decision is attached hereto 
as Exhibit "D". Judge Stegner's very well thought out decision noted: 
"As internal guidelines, the SOPs and manuals may be changed with impunity by the 
agency head whenever he chooses and are not vetted by anyone other than the ISP. 
Internal guidelines do not have the force and effect of law. Id. They can only govern 
the internal management of an agency and they can not effect private rights or 
procedures available to the public. Id. 
Opinion at p. 10. 
Judge Stegner goes on to note that the SOPs and manuals are not rules and that they cannot 
supplement the Rules of Evidence. Judge Stegner states that Idaho Rule of Evidence 1101 makes 
it clear that statutes and rules cannot effect the Rules of Evidence. Judge Stegner also determined 
that the admissibility of evidence is within the inherent judicial power of the Courts and that the 
legislature has no power to deprive the judiciary of its power. Judge Stegner wrote: 
"The fact of the matter is that the ISP is now vested with the unilateral power to 
prescribe the admission of breath testing evidence in Idaho Courts. As a result, the 
statute violates the separation of doctrine powers." 
Opinion at p. 14. 
Attached as Exhibits A, B, and C to the Reply Brief are letters sent to ISPFS regarding 
Freedom oflnformation Requests for information justifying the January 2013 changes to the SOP. 
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There is a March 20, 2013, letter to Major Wills. R. at p. 528. There is a letter to Matthew Garnette 
dated March 28, 2013 R. at p. 531. There is a letter dated April 8, 2013, to Major Wills. R. at p. 533. 
A response to the April 8, 2013, letter is also as Exhibit D to the Reply Brief in which ISPFS noted: 
"No record found" regarding any peer review, scientific literature, scientific testing or science 
behind the changes made in section 6 changing the word "must" to "should", in the new provisions 
that took effect on January 16, 2013, for the SOP. R. at p. 536. 
The Court of Appeals has already determined that the SOP is not a rule, it is not a standard, 
and that ID APA Rule 11.03.01.014.03 is not sufficient as compliance with LC.§ 18-8002A(3). State 
v. Swenson, 156 Idaho 633,329 P.3d 1081 (Ct. App. 2014). Judge Brudie and Judge Stegner both 
found that the SOPs are not rules and have no legal force in the law. However, each Judge gave a 
different effect to his finding. Judge Brudie was wrong while Judge Stegner was right. The State 
of Idaho has recognized that Judge Stegner was correct by the Stevenson e-mail and the language 
found in the Notice of Rulemaking for new breath testing rules. 
B. The Standard Operating Procedures for Breath Alcohol 
Testing Issued by the ISP Lack the Force and Effect of Law. 
"In practice rules and regulations have the same effect on people's daily lives as does 
statutory law. Both have the ability to greatly affect an individual's personal freedom 
and/or property. It makes little difference if the authority is a statute passed by the 
legislature or a regulation adopted by an administrative agency. The effect is the 
same." 
This statement by former Speaker of the Idaho House of Representatives and current U.S. 
Congressman Michael Simpson underscores the pervasiveness of administrative rules in the lives 
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ofldahoans and the serious nature of rulemaking. Because of this, as was stated in the 2009 edition 
of The Idaho Rule Writer's Manual, the rulemaking process in Idaho "aims to involve all persons 
affected by state agency administrative rules and make transparent the regulatory process through 
which our statutory laws are implemented and [how] the practice and procedure requirements of our 
governmental agencies are established. C.L. "Butch" Otter, Mike Gwartney, & Dennis R. Stevenson, 
The Idaho Rule Writer's Manual: A Guide for Drafting and Promulgating Administrative Rules in 
the State of Idaho, ( 2009)( emphasis added). 
The Idaho Administrative Procedure Act (IAP A), codified at Title 67, Chapter 52, Idaho 
Code, governs rulemaking in Idaho. The Idaho Administrative Procedure Act (hereinafter "IAP A") 
defines rulemaking as the process for the formulation, adoption, amendment, or repeal of a rule. 
Idaho Code§ 67-5201 (20). Through rulemaking an agency interprets, prescribes, and implements 
statutory law. Id. It also clarifies, standardizes, or establishes the agency's procedure or practice 
requirements. Id. All of this rulemaking is done under authority granted to the agency by the Idaho 
Legislature through its passing of an enabling statute. As such, rules may be promulgated by an 
agency only when specifically authorized by statute. LC. § 67-5231 (1 ). Collectively, this is an 
agency's ability to make "law" under powers granted by the Legislature through statute.3 All rules 
promulgated within the authority conferred by statute and in accordance with the IAP A, have the full 
force and effect of law and must be regarded as such. Higginson v. Westergard, l 00 Idaho 687, 690, 
3 An agency also has the ability to make "law" under powers granted by the Idaho Constitution in that agency rulemaking grants no authority 
not already conferred by statute or the Constitution. 
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604 P.2d 51, 54 (1979). As such, just as a law would be overturned by the courts, a rule is invalid 
if (1) is was not promulgated in substantial compliance with the procedural requirements of the 
IAPA, (2) does not meet legislative intent, or (3) exceeds or is outside the agency's substantive 
rulemaking or statutory authority. I.C. § 67-5279(3), Bennett v. State, Dept. o/Transp., 147 Idaho 
141,206 P.3d 505 (Ct. App. 2009). 
A court may overturn an agency's decision where its findings, inferences, conclusions, or 
decisions: (a) violate statutory or constitutional provisions; (b) exceed the agency's statutory 
authority; ( c) are made upon unlawful procedure; ( d) are not supported by substantial evidence in 
the record; or (e) are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. I.C. § 67-5279(3), Cooper v. 
Board of Professional Discipline o.f Idaho State Bd. o.fMedicine, 134 Idaho 44, 94 P .3d 561 (2000). 
The administrative license suspension statute (hereinafter "ALS"), I.C. § 18-8002A, requires that 
the Idaho Transportation Department suspend the driver's license of a driver who has failed a BAC 
test administered by a law enforcement officer. Wilkinson v. State Dept. o.fTransp, 151 Idaho 784, 
264 P.3d 680 (Ct. App. 2011). The ALS hearing officer must uphold the suspension unless he or she 
finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the driver has shown one of several grounds 
enumerated in LC. § 18-8002A(7) for vacating the suspension. Id. One of the five enumerated 
grounds for vacating the suspension is "the tests for alcohol concentration, drugs or other 
intoxicating substances administered at the direction of the peace officer were not conducted in 
accordance with the requirements of section 18-8004(4), Idaho Code." I.C. § 18-8002A(7)(d). 
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Idaho Code§ 18-8004(4) provides that tests to determine alcohol concentration of blood, urine, or 
breath must be performed in facilities or by methods approved by the Idaho State Police and in 
compliance with standards set by the State Police. Mahurin v. State Dep't ofTransp., 140 Idaho 656, 
658, 99 P.3d 125, 127 (Ct.App.2004). To carry out the authority conferred by that statute, the State 
Police issued standard operating procedure manuals (herein after "SOPs") establishing procedures 
for the maintenance and operation of breath test equipment. See IDAHO ADMIN. CODE 
11.03.01.014. However, the SOPs are invalid as rules, and therefore, the ITD action resting on the 
SOPs must be set aside. 
The SOPs are invalid as rules because they were not promulgated in accordance with the 
rulemaking procedures of the IAP A. The Idaho legislature expressly authorized rules on "what 
calibration or checking of testing equipment must be performed ... " I.C. § 18-8002A(3)(b). But 
the legislature also required those rules to be promulgated "pursuant to Chapter 52, title 67, Idaho 
Code" - i.e., the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act. Id. The IAP A defines a rule, in relevant part, 
as an agency statement "that has been promulgated in compliance with" its requirements. LC.§ 67-
5201 (19). In the absence of such compliance, the SOPs are not rules and therefore lack the force and 
effect of law. They cannot be the basis for an agency or the court to determine legal rights or 
liabilities. Therefore, because the standard operating procedures for breath alcohol testing are invalid 
for failure to follow proper rulemaking procedures under the IAP A, any agency action, like an ALS 
Decision, resting on the SOP must be set aside. 
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If the ISP desires to adopt a "statement ... that ... prescribes ... law," it must comply with the 
IAPA's rulemaking procedures. Michael S. Gilmore & Dale D. Goble, The Idaho Administrative 
Procedure Act: A Primer For The Practitioner, 30 Idaho L. Rev. 273 (1994). If the agency has not 
complied with these requirements, it has not promulgated a 'rule' and the statement lacks the force 
and effect oflaw. Id citing § 67-5201, cmt. 16. If an agency wishes to impose legal obligations on 
a class of persons, it must promulgate a rule. Id., see also Service Employees Jnt'l Union v. Idaho 
Dep't of Health& Welfare, 106 Idaho 756, 758-59, 683 P.2d404, 406-07 (1984) (agency manual that 
had not been promulgated as a rule did not create legal rights or responsibilities). It is readily 
apparent through the lack of a rulemaking record, lack of publication in the Bulletin, and lack of 
public input that the ISP acted without first promulgating a rule when it issued the ever-changing 
SOPs. This is problematic because the ISP, ALS hearing officers and Idaho courts use the SOPs as 
if they are rules. See State v. Besaw, 155 Idaho 134, 306 P.3d 219 (Ct. App. 2013) (wherein the 
Court states, "We have treated those documents [Standard Operating Procedures for breath testing] 
as "rules" for purposes of judicial review because the parties have done so and because they 
constitute the only material by which the ISP has purported to authorize testing instruments and 
methods."); Platz v. State, 154 Idaho 960,303 P.3d 647 (Ct. App. 2013) ("We have treated those 
documents as "rules" for purposes of judicial review because they constitute the only materials by 
which the ISP has acted upon the Idaho Code § 18- 8002A(3) authorization for the ISP to "prescribe 
by rule." testing instruments and methods that are approved by the ISP, citing Hubbard v. 
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Department of Transportation, 152 Id. 879,276 P.3d 751 (Ct. App. 2012), and In re Schroeder, 147 
Idaho 476,479 n. 3,210 P.3d 584,587 n. 3 (Ct.App.2009). To be fair, the Idaho courts do not limit 
its use of SOPs as "rules" as applicable only to the detriment of defendants, because it has also used 
SOPs as "rules" against the ISP when it fails to follow the mandatory procedures contained in the 
SOPs. For example, in 2006 the Court of Appeals held that the ALS hearing officer must vacate a 
driver's license suspension when it was determined that the ISP violated a mandatory provision 
contained in its SOP. Gibbar v. State of Idaho, DepartmentofTransportation, 143 Id. 937, 155 P.3d 
1176, (Ct. App. 2006); see also Mahurin v. State of Idaho, Department of Transportation, 140 Id. 
65, 99 P.3d 125, (2004) (stating noncompliance with these procedures [as contained in the ISP issued 
SOP for breath testing procedures] is a ground for vacating an administrative license suspension 
under I.C. § 18-8002A(7)( d)). Unfortunately, the ISP, ALS hearing officers and Idaho courts' use 
of the SOPs as "rules" is in error. Under Idaho law, in order to have the force and effect oflaw an 
agency action characterized as a rule must be promulgated according to statutory directives for 
rulemaking. See I.C. § 67-5231 (declaring rules invalid unless adopted in substantial compliance 
with the requirements of the IAPA); Asarco Inc. v. State, 2003, 69 P.3d 139,138 Idaho 719 (2003) 
(stating agency action was a "rule," and thus had to be promulgated in accordance with 
Administrative Procedures Act to be valid.); Meadv. Arnell, 117 Idaho 660,664, 791 P.2d410, 414 
(1989) (holding rules promulgated by agency action have the force and effect of law). I.C. § 
67-5201 et seq. Therefore, in the absence of evidence of substantial compliance with rulemaking 
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procedures, this Court must decide that the SOPs are not "rules" and thus, do not have the full force 
and effect oflaw. If the SOP for breath alcohol testing does not have the full force and effect oflaw, 
it cannot be the basis for an agency or the court to determine legal rights or liabilities and any agency 
action resting on the SOP for breath alcohol testing must be set aside. 
C. There Is No Evidence The Idaho State Police Engaged In Proper 
Rulemaking Procedure In Compliance With IDAPA When It Issued The 
Standard Operating Procedures For Breath Alcohol Testing. 
The ISP did not engage in the formal rulemaking procedures of the IAP A when it issued its 
ever-changing SOPs. This is in direct conflict to the purpose for having formal rulemaking 
procedures. By requiring agency decision makers to comply with procedural norms of openness and 
rationality, the IAP A both creates procedural guarantees and limits agency discretion. Michael S. 
Gilmore & Dale D. Goble, The Idaho Administrative Procedure Act: A Primer For The Practitioner, 
30 Idaho L. Rev. 273 (1994). Moreover, the drafters of the IAPA also sought to implement broad 
policy goals such as opening up the administrative process to increased public participation and 
scrutiny and regularizing agency proceedings. Id. But, when an agency is engaged in rulemaking it 
is acting in a legislative capacity and the process constitutionally due does not include an 
individualized hearing. See Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 
(1915). Because of this comparatively minimal due process requirement, the importance of statutory 
procedures and safeguards increases. These statutory procedures are contained in §§ LC. 67-5220 
to 67-5232. Idaho's administrative rulemaking process contains five stages: proposed, negotiated, 
temporary, pending, and final. The following is a description of the rulemaking process under the 
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IAP A from the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality: First, proposed rulemaking is the stage 
in which the agency proposes to amend or repeal an existing rule or to adopt a new rule. Prior to the 
adoption, amendment, or repeal of a rule, the agency is required to publish a notice and the text of 
the proposed rule in the Idaho Administrative Bulletin. During this stage, the public is invited to 
submit comments to the agency. Second, negotiated rulemaking is an optional process in which all 
interested parties and the agency seek a consensus on the content of a rule. Agencies are encouraged 
to proceed through this informal stage whenever feasible. This stage is initiated with the publication 
of a Notice of Negotiated Rulemaking in the Idaho Administrative Bulletin. This process leads to 
the proposed and/or temporary rulemaking stages. Temporary rulemaking is third. If the Governor 
finds that temporary adoption of a rule (a) protects the public health, safety, or welfare; (b) complies 
with deadlines in amendments to governing law or federal programs; or ( c) confers a benefit, the 
agency may proceed with temporary rulemaking. A temporary rule may become effective 
immediately upon adoption and expires upon conclusion of the next succeeding regular legislative 
session unless extended by concurrent resolution. Once the temporary rule is adopted, the agency is 
required to publish a notice and the text of the temporary rule in the Idaho Administrative Bulletin. 
If the text of the temporary rule is the same as that of the proposed rule, the rulemaking can be 
combined and published in the Idaho Administrative Bulletin as a temporary/proposed rule. Next, 
a pending rule is a rule that has been adopted by an agency under the regular rulemaking process and 
remains subject to legislative review before becoming final and effective. Once the pending rule is 
adopted, the agency is required to publish a notice of pending rule in the Idaho Administrative 
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Bulletin. If the rule varies in content from that which was initially proposed, the pending rule also 
must be printed in the Idaho Administrative Bulletin. A pending rule must be submitted to the 
legislature for review before it can become final and effective. Finally, and unless specified 
otherwise, a pending rule that has been submitted for review and approved by the legislature will 
become final and effective upon conclusion of that legislative session. Final rules are annually 
codified in the Idaho Administrative Code. 
As applied to the standard operating procedures, there is absolutely no evidence to suggest 
that the ISP was in compliance with any of the steps above to even remotely show that it followed 
the IAP A to properly promulgate the SOPs as "rules." In fact, quite the opposite is true. 
Not only has the ISP not followed the proper rulemaking procedure of the IAP A when issuing 
SOPs, it actually takes a very laid-back and painfully informal approach to creating SOPs. Because 
ISP did not engage in the formal rulemaking procedures under the IAPA, the SOPs are merely 
guidelines and do not have the full force and effect of law to the extent an agency decision can rest 
upon them. 
To be clear, and by its own reference, the issuing authority of the breath alcohol testing SOP 
is the "ISPFS Quality Manager," recognized to stand for Idaho State Police Forensic Science Quality 
Manager. See Idaho State Police Forensic Services, 6.0 Idaho Breath Alcohol Standard Operating 
Procedure Breath Alcohol Testing, Revision 5, 08/2013. But, the ISPFS is part of the Idaho State 
Police, insomuch as its actions amount to actions by the ISP. The Forensic Section did not begin as 
part of the State Police department, but officially became pai1 of the Idaho State Police in 1999 when 
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the Bureau of Forensic Services became ISP Forensic Services.4 So while the ISPFS is the" issuing 
authority" of the breath testing SOP, because it is part of the ISP, it too must follow the proper 
rulemaking procedure of the IAPA when issuing SOPs. 
"6.0 Idaho Standard Operating Procedure Breath Alcohol Testing, Revision 5, Effective 
8/20/2013" is the most current version of the Idaho State Police's SOP for breath alcohol testing. 
This is the second "new edition" in the year 2013, with Revision 4 taking effect a mere 7 months 
prior to the latest edition.5 Additionally, while the year 2012 saw only one revision6, Revision 3, the 
year 2010 saw three different editions of this SOP.7 If the discussion stopped right there, it is 
patently obvious that these SOPs are readily changed and revised with relative ease and in a fast, and 
likely cost-effective, manner. This is in contrast to the typical tirneline for rulemaking when 
following the proper rulemaking procedures under the IAP A. That tirneline consists of months, but 
is understandable how formal rulemaking would take longer, because it are these formal procedural 
safeguards that prevent the arbitrary and on a whim changes that are seen in the current way the 
SOPs are created. Nevertheless, this discussion continues. 
4 SIT IDAHO STATE POLICE, History of ISP Forensics, available at http://www.isp. idaho.goviforcnsicsiindex.html "The lc1rcnsics unit had ils 
bq,inning., in I ()61 11hcn the Di, is ion or l .ah()ratorics in the rkpartmc:nl or Health csrahlishcJ an anal; ti cal unit lt1r the analysis or blood and 
breath ,ilcoh1,i for the Idaho State Police. ·1 he Forensic Section was transferred to the Dcpmtmrnt of Law Enforcement from rhc Bure,1u llf 
Laboratories in the Dq1artmcm of I kalth and Wdl"arc Jul\ I, 1988. The name of the Department changnl to Idaho State l\iiicc Jul\ 1. I 999 and gw Bureau ol fon.Thic Scrvics:s became [SP Forensic S-:n·iccs. ,, 
SE!:' IDAHO STATE POLICE FORENSIC SERVICES, 6.0 Idaho Breath Alcohol Standard Operating Procedure Breath Alcohol Testing, Revision 
5,08/2013, page 5. 
6 ID. 
? ID 
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Even though the ISP approach to issuing the SOPs is painfully informal, we recognize it 
would be helpful to the Court to have an outline of what procedure the ISP does follow when it 
wishes to change, revise or implement an SOP. Unfortunately, the ISP's approach is so painfully 
informal, that there doesn't appear to be much in the way of a record from which an outline can be 
created. What we do know is that the SOPs are frequently revised. Further the 2009 SOP was nine 
pages long and the first SOP of 2010 was 17 pages long - see Exhibit "E" attached hereto. But, we 
have no information about who determined what changes would be made and/or why. Additionally, 
and over the years, there appears to be significant changes with regard to the word "must." Many 
instances of the word "must" in earlier editions of the SOP was evidently changed to "should." For 
example. In the 2009 SOP, section 6.1 stated: "Prior to evidentiary breath alcohol testing, the 
subject/individual must be monitored for at least fifteen (15) minute." (emphasis added) Compare 
this to the SOP dated November 1, 2010, wherein section 6.1 stated: "Prior to evidentiary breath 
alcohol testing, the subject/individual should be monitored for at least fifteen (15) minutes." 
(emphasis added) From the documents obtained under the Freedom oflnformation Act, it appears 
that concerns, revisions, and most discussions regarding the SOPs occur over e-mail. 
Jeremy Johnston in an email to prosecutors and others, which is dated December 19, 2012, 
stated: "I have made some changes to the SOP due to rulings, suggestions and need for 
clarifications. Please review this and see if there needs to more or less added." Augmented record, 
Rat p. 201. The court can review the emails generated just prior to the introduction of the SOP on 
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January 16, 2013. Augmented record, Rat pp. 176-228. These emails represent the reasons for the 
change of the SOP from the one dated April 23, 2012. No science is noted to justify the changes. 
No science is noted to justify the changes from "must" to "should" in the SOP. There is no 
indication in the emails that the machines have changed and there is no explanation as to why 30 
years of mandatory language has been replaced with discretionary language. 
On May 11, 2012, just a few days after the SOP was modified in April, Jeremy Johnston 
sends the following email to one "kmumford@kcgovus": "What was the wording you wanted for 
the SOP change that we had talked about a few weeks back? I'm having a conference call next week 
about the changes and wanted to get the wording right in there so it works for all sides". Augmented 
R. at p. 199. What science justifies the changes to the SOP so often? See SOP History Page, 
Augmented Record, R. at p. 182. There is no science. 
Please note that the Idaho Supreme Court has determined an agency action is capricious if 
it was done without a rational basis. In American Law Association of Idaho/Nevada v. State, 142 
Id. 544, 130 P.3d 1082 (2006), the Court found it was arbitrary if the agency action was done in 
disregard of the facts and circumstances presented or without adequate determining principles. What 
was the rational basis for making the SOP a discretionary document? There was a disregard of 
scientific principles, facts and circumstances making the current SOP arbitrary. 
The e-mails noted in this case make it clear that ISPFS failed to comply with the mandate of 
LC. § 18-8004( 4) and LC.section l 8-8002A. 
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states: 
There is a specific e-mail from Darren Jewkes to several employees of the ISPFS. Mr. Jewkes 
"I am not sure if I dare ask, but are there any other parts of the SOP that you 
feel needs immediate attention, such as changing "will" to "may" or 
"approximately" or doing away with "monthly" etc. (Jeremy here is your 
chance:)." (emphasis added) 
Augmented Record, R. at p. 82 
It is interesting to note that in this e-mail, Darren Jewkes actually uses the":)" symbol. 
The legislature passed I.C. § I 8-8004( 4) requiring valid methods of breath testing. ISPFS 
has made rules that weaken the breath testing standards so much that basically if the police get a 
result, it is admissible. Therefore, ISPFS has taken this delegation of authority to an unconstitutional 
level. 
This should be a discussion of improvements to the scientific methods, not improvements 
to the methods to withstand legal challenges. In support of this, the Court can note that there is very 
little science discussed in the e-mails with regards to changes to the SOPs. This is concerning 
because the procedures used to test and the operation of the breath test machines are very scientific 
in nature and require adherence that facilitates proper use so as to provide a reliable result. Even the 
Court of Appeals recognized the importance of a reliable result in that "the purpose of [J.C.] I 8-
8002, is to provide an incentive for motorists to cooperate in determining levels of blood-alcohol 
content by a reasonably precise scientific method." ( emphasis added). State v. Breed, 111 Idaho 497, 
725 P.2d 202 (Ct. App. 1986). Moreover, the reason the legislature has allowed the expedited 
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introduction of breath test results in DUis and ALS matters is because of the guarantee of science. 
See State v. Bell, 115 Idaho 36, 764 P.2d 113 (Ct. App. 1988), State v. Phillips, 117 Idaho 609, 790 
P.2d 390 (Ct. App. 1990). 
Wherein the Court of Appeal's in State v. Besaw, 155 Idaho 134, 306 P.3d 219 (Ct. App. 
2013), stated in a footnote, "We have not however, held that these SOPs and manuals actually 
constitute 'rules' or that ISP has 'prescribed by rule' testing instruments and methods as 
contemplated by Idaho Code 18-8002A(3); that issue has never been presented to this court," this 
Court is. As Mr. Bramble-Smollett cried in Humphry Clinker, "there is no time like the present." 
With this question now presented to this Court, it's time for a determination of the status of the 
SOPs. By its own account, the ISPFS indicates that the coming years "will see ISP Forensic Services 
continue to contribute fair and impartial scientific analysis to the criminal justice system. [ And] 
Incorporation ofimproved analytical methods and continuing quality assurance programs will assure 
the perpetuation of high standards currently maintained by the unit. 8" It is clear, through its painfully 
informal process of creating and modifying the standard operating procedures that the ISP needs 
guidance from this court to help facilitate it's goals of "contributing fair and impartial scientific 
analysis" and "incorporating improved analytical methods and continuing quality assurance 
programs" so that it may effectively perpetuate the high standards it currently maintains. 
8 SEE IDAHO STATE POLICE, History of ISP Forensics, available at http://www.isp.idaho.gov/forensics/index.html. 
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Ultimately, the SOP for breath testing procedure cannot be characterized as "rules" because 
they were not promulgated in compliance with the formal rulemaking procedures of the IAPA, and 
as such, do not have the full force and effect of law. However, if this Court decides the SOPs are 
in fact "rules," as they are so treated by Idaho courts, ALS hearing officers and the ISP, this Court 
must contemporaneously find that the SOPs for breath alcohol testing are invalid for failing to 
substantially comply with the with the procedural requirements of the IAP A. And again, an invalid 
"rule" does not have the full force and effect oflaw. It is clear, then, that regardless of whether or 
not this Court determines the SOP to be a "rule" or not, the SOP for breath alcohol testing does not 
have the full force and effect oflaw and it cannot be the basis for an agency or the court to determine 
legal rights or liabilities. Therefore, any agency action resting on the SOP for breath alcohol testing 
must be set aside. 
II. 
THERE IS NO DUE PROCESS IN ALS HEARINGS 
Mr. Hem was arrested for DUI on April 5, 2013. Clerk's Exhibit 2, Rat p. I. Mr. Hern was 
served with the Administrative License on April 6, 2013. Clerk's Exhibit 2, R. at p. I. Mr. Hem's 
temporary license expired on May 5, 2013. Mr. Hem's hearing was schedule for May 9, 2013. Mr. 
Hern was without driving privileges prior to the hearing. Counsel for Mr. Hem asked for a stay on 
May 9, 2013. The hearing officer initially ordered a stay on May 10, 2013, and back-dated the Stay 
Order four (4) days to May 6, 2013. Said back dating didn't do Mr. Hem much good because the 
stay wasn't in effect and his license was suspended as of May 5, 2013. The order did not transport 
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Mr. Hem back in time. The initial Stay Order (Clerk's Exhibit 2, Rat p. 61) notes that Mr. Hern did 
not get the benefit of the fact that his license had been suspended. Mr. Hem's attorney sent a letter 
to the hearing officer on May 10, 2013, stating that the hearing officer's May 10, 2013 Order did not 
note that Mr. Hem's license had been suspended already. The hearing office issued another Stay 
Order lessening the license suspension from 90 days to 85 days. Clerk's Exhibit 2 at p. 62. Mr. Hern 
was without his license for a period time before a hearing had been held and before a decision was 
reached. A decision wasn't reached until May 24, 2013. Record at pp. 9-30. 
The District Court fails to acknowledge that Mr. Hern, ifhe had won his ALS hearing, would 
have been irreparably harmed because his license had been suspended without hearing and the 
hearing was delayed without just cause. The show cause letter was inappropriate as it could not be 
contested and was not based on any foundation for good cause. Another driver and client of 
Counsel's, Geoffrey Cseh Jr., ITD File No. 648000143728, won his ALS hearing but this was days 
after his license was suspended. His hearing was held after his temporary license ended because he 
requested subpoenas, also like Mr. Hern. He had no due process in his hearing. He was harmed 
without an ability to repair said harm. The argument regarding no due process is not hypothetical 
as Judge Brudie believed. The lack of a license was a reality to Mr. Cseh. 
The Court of Appeals strongly discouraged the practice that it found rampant in these ALS 
cases about hearings being scheduled improperly and subpoenas being issued in such a fashion that 
the driver was at a disadvantage. 
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Look at what was subpoenaed in the Hern case: the arresting officer, the log sheet, and the 
video. How exactly is a driver supposed to meet his burden of proof without this basic relevant 
evidence? Clearly the legislature contemplated, by the very definition found in LC. § 18-
8002A(l )(f), that subpoenas and relevant evidence would be forthcoming within the twenty (20) day 
standard set in LC. § 18-8002A(7). 
Mr. Hern was served the Notice of Suspension on April 6, 2013. He made a request to the 
Department for a hearing and subpoenas on April 9, 2013. The hearing officer didn't bother to issue 
the subpoenas until April 15, 2013. The hearing officer generated a straw man of"good cause" when 
he didn't issue the subpoenas until six ( 6) days after the notice was received. There is no explanation 
for this delay. 
It should also be recognized that the hearing officers have no standards for issuing stays. 
There is no standard or rule regarding good cause. The hearing officers just willy-nilly decide what 
cases they are going to stay and what cases they don't. See George J. Besaw, Jr. v. State of Idaho, 
Department of Transportation, Docket No. 39759-2012 
The hearing officer's decision, however, is convoluted with regard to his ability to decide 
the due process issue. On the one hand, the hearing officer argues that the issue of due process is 
not a part of J.C. § 18-8002A(7) and, thus, he comes to the conclusion that a hearing officer can only 
vacate a licensed suspension based on the five statutory grounds. Clerk's Exhibit 2 R. at 13 7. Yet 
the hearing officer indicates there is no basis for finding a due process violation. Clerk's Exhibit 2 
at p. 136. The one thing we do know is that Mr. Hern had a Notice of Suspension that said it was 
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served on April 6, 2013. Actually there is no knowing when Mr. Hem was actually served because 
the arresting officer did not personally serve Mr. Hem. Clerk Exhibit 1, Tr. at p. 11. We do know 
a hearing was requested on April 9, 2013, and LC.§ 18-8002A(7) states, in pertinent, part as follows: 
"If a hearing is requested, the hearing shall be held within twenty (20) days of the 
date the hearing request was received by the Department unless this period is, for 
good cause shown, extended by the hearing officer for one ten day period." 
Based on a hearing request being made on April 9, 2013, a hearing should have been held 
on or before April 29, 2013. Instead, the hearing officer noted that a hearing would be held on May 
9, 2013. 
The hearing officer indicates that the Department routinely allows three days for service of 
the subpoena and ten days for production of the requested evidence. Clerk's Exhibit 2 at p. 135. If 
that is the case, then the subpoenas would have been served by April 18, 2013, and the evidence 
produced by April 28, 2013. If the subpoenas were issued on April 9, 2013 then they would have 
been served by April 12, 2013, and the evidence produced by April 22, 2013 and the hearing could 
have been held on April 24, 25, 26, 29 or 30 or on May 1,2, or 3, 2013. All these dates are before 
the 30 day temporary license expires. 
The information from the arresting officer was sent to the Department on April 10, 2013. 
Clerk's Exhibit 2 at p. 1 (note the date stamp at the bottom right hand comer of some parts of the 
record) The Department indicates that it forwarded the audio/video recording April 14, 2013, the 
performance verification records on April 18, 2013, and the reports on April 19, 2103. Clerk's 
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Exhibit 2 at p. 135. However, the record actually shows that the breath testing machine logs were 
sent out on April 17, 2013. Clerk's Exhibit 2 at p. 75. 
Case law allows a driver's license to be suspended prior to a due process hearing. The 
reasons were set out in a series of United States Supreme Court cases. In Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 
645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, (1977), the U.S. Supreme Court stated: 
"This court has not, however, embraced the general proposition that a wrong may be 
done if it can be undone. Cf. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. of Bayview, 395 
U.S. 337, 89 S.Ct. 1820, 23 L.Ed.2d 349, (1969). Surely, in this case before us, if 
there is a delay between the doing and the undoing petitioner suffers from the 
deprivation of his children, and the children suffer from the uncertainty and 
dis! ocated." 
At p. 647. 
In Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971 ), the Court stated once 
licenses are issued, ... their continued possession may become essential in the pursuit of a livelihood. 
Suspension of issued licenses .. .involves state action that adjudicates important interests of the 
licensee. In such cases the licenses are not to be taken away without that procedural due process 
required by the Fourteenth Amendment. At p. 539. 
The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard "at a meaningful 
time and in a meaningful manner." Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545,552, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 1191, 
14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965). See also Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385,394, 34 S.Ct. 79, 783, 58 L.Ed. 
1363 (1914) and Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 343-344, 96 S.Ct. at 907. 
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As the U.S. Supreme Court recognized in Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 97 S.Ct. 1723, 52 
L.Ed.2d 172, (1977) the interest in a driver's license is a substantial one. The State will not be able 
to make a driver whole for any personal inconveniences and economic hardships suffered by reason 
of any delay in redressing an erroneous post suspension review procedure. 4 31 U.S. at 131, 91 S. Ct. 
at 1728. 
In Bell v. Burson, supra, the Court deemed it fundamental that except in emergencies 
situations, the state must afford a hearing before a driver's license termination become effective. It 
is interesting to note that the U.S. Supreme Court, with regard to these sorts of issues, focuses on 
credibility and veracity. See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 343-344, 96 S.Ct. at 907. The 
suspension itself effects the final deprivation of property that no subsequence proceeding can restore. 
See again Mathews v. Eldridge, supra, 424 U.S. at 340, 96 S.Ct. at 905. The court in Bell v. Burson, 
supra, made it quite clear that additional expense occasioned by expanding the hearing process is 
sufficient to withstand the constitutional requirement. While the problem of additional expense must 
be kept in mind, it does not justify denying a hearing meeting the ordinary standards of due process. 
At pp. 541-542. 
In Bell v. Idaho Department of Transportation, 151 Idaho 659, 262 P .3d. 1030 (2011 ), the 
Court found the actions of the hearing officer troubling because there seemed to be a disregard for 
Bell's substantial interest in receiving a decision before, or at least, promptly after the deprivation 
of his license. Bell at p. 671. 
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The Bell Court in a footnote stated: 
"If delays of this magnitude occurred in a case where the driver ultimately prevailed, 
the driver would have suffered a remediable and unacceptable lost of driving 
privileges for over three quarters of the minimum suspension term described by Idaho 
Code § l 8-8002A( 4 )(a) before issuance of a decision overturning the suspension." 
At p. 671. 
The Court in Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) 
determined whether an administrative proceeding satisfies due process. The first factor deals with 
the private interest that would be effected by the official action. The second involves the risk of an 
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used and the probable value, if any, 
of additional or substitute procedural safeguards. The final factor involves the government's interest 
including the function involved in the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or 
substitute procedure would entail. See Bell, supra. 
The Court In The Matter of Wilson, 128 Idaho 161, 167; 911 P.2d 754 (1996), simply stated: 
"Procedural due process requires that a party be provided at an opportunity to be heard at a 
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner". See also Cootz v. State, 117 Idaho 38, 785 P.2d 163 
(1989) and Abrams v. Jones, 35 Idaho 532, 207 P. 724 (1922), 
stating: 
In a footnote, the Platz court cites its concern regarding pre-decision suspensions in Bell by 
"Although Bell's repeated request for irrelevant discovery contributed somewhat to 
the hearing's postponement, the delays involved here are troubling to this court. The 
actions of the hearing officer evidences little regard for Bell's substantial interests in 
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receiving the decision before, or at least promptly after, the deprivation of this 
license. Bell v. !TD, 151 Id. 659,671,262 P.3d 1030, 1040 (Ct. App. 2011)." 
At p. 661. 
In Bell v. Burson, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that Georgia had several alternative 
methods of compliance. One involved Georgia electing to abandon its present scheme completely 
and pursue one of the various alternatives in force in other states. At p. 543. Georgia could also 
reject all of the above suggestion and devise an entirely new regulatory scheme. The fact is that ITD 
continues to delete sections of the ID APA rules that benefit the driver such as the ID APA, Rule 
39.02.72.600. This rule required hearing officers to have decisions done within 30 days. The Court 
can address these issues on review and send a message like the U.S. Supreme Court did in Bell v. 
Burson that the state should just take the several alternative methods of compliance available to it 
and bring the ALS system in compliance with due process. 
The Bell court stated: 
"However, an undue delay in holding a post-suspension hearing or issuing a decision 
may constitute a deprivation of due process. Federal Deposit Ins. v. Mallen, 486 
U.S. 230,242 (1988); Jones v. City of Gary, Ind., 57 F.3d 1435, 1444 (7th Cir. 1995); 
Padberg v. lvfcGarth-A1cKechnie, 203 F. Supp. 2d 261,278 (E.D.N.Y. 2002), affd 
60 F.App'x 861 (2d Cir. 2003)." 
At p. 670. 
Please recall that ALS hearing officers can not make constitutional decisions based on the 
administrative statutes that apply to these administrative hearings. IDAPA Rule, 4.11.01.415. The 
Court in Bell v. !TD, supra, failed to note this in its decision about the failure of the driver to raise 
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this constitutional issue with the ITD hearing officer. See Bell at p. 671 
Mr. Hern has a interest in his driver's license that is quite substantial. The record in this case 
shows that there is a risk of erroneous deprivation of his driver's license through the current 
procedures used. Clearly, it would be easy enough to modify the procedure to note that the 
temporary license does not terminate until the hearing officer's decision is reached. The State of 
Washington uses this procedure. RCW §§ 46.25.125(6) and 46.20.308(8). The government's 
interest in changing this procedure is minimal and there is no administrative burden. In fact, 
extending the time frame for decisions and suspensions probably would be welcomed by the ALS 
hearing officers because they would have more time to issue decisions and not be overburdened with 
the few days they have from when the hearing is held until when the temporary license expires. 
There is no due process in this ALS process. The factors found in A1atthews v. Eldridge, 424 
U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) are found in this case. 
III. 
THE ACTIONS OF THE HEARING OFFICER 
VIOLATED MR. HERN'S EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS. 
The decision by Judge Brudie in Hern regarding equal protection simply misses the point. 
Mr. Hem's equal protection rights were violated because he was treated differently because he 
requested subpoenas not because the requested Subpoenas were denied. Mr. Hern did not get the 
benefit of a timely hearing within twenty (20) days of a request for hearing specifically because he 
requested subpoenas. His argument has nothing to do with subpoenas being requested and denied 
or how any specific subpoena may have led to information relevant to a defense of his license 
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suspension. The District Judge in Mr. Hem's case basically ignored the argument that was put 
before him. 
The simple facts of this case show that Mr. Hern, and all other drivers requesting the most 
basic information, are being treated differently than those drivers that don't ask for subpoenas. Or 
maybe there is a different standard if you just ask for the arresting officer to be subpoenaed. Or 
maybe there is a different standard if the driver requests just the log sheet. Who knows? There are 
no ITD rules that the Court can review. This practice of shooting from the hip in issuing show cause 
letters without hearings or any justification for a hearing delay does not allow for due process or 
equal protection and cannot be explained away by the Invited Error Doctrine, which is what State 
argued below. 
The hearing officer has a duty to issue subpoenas and gather relevant evidence. LC. § l 8-
8002A(l )( f). The hearing officer has a duty to have a hearing within 20 days of the receipt of the 
request for hearing from the driver. The hearing officer in Mr. Hern' s case choose to set the hearing 
after the 20 days mandated by the legislature because Mr. Hern asked that subpoenas be issued for 
relevant evidence. The hearing officer specifically noted this as the cause for the extension to May 
9, 2013. Clerk's Exhibit 2 R. at pp 94 and 135. Under the rational basis test a classification will 
withstand an equal protection challenge if there is any conceivable state of facts that will support it. 
Afeisner v. Potlatch Corp., 131 Id. 258,954 P2d 676, (1998). The equal protection clauses ofthe 
Idaho and federal constitutions embrace principles that all persons in like circumstances should 
receive the same benefit and burdens of the law. Here Mr. Hern was treated differently because he 
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requested subpoenas. He was punished for taking the small advantage allowed him from the ALS 
statute regarding limited discovery. There is nothing in this record that supports Mr. Hem being 
treated differently than a driver who does not request limited discovery. Remember, Mr. Hem has 
the burden of proof in this ALS matter. This burden is difficult to meet without some of the 
"relevant evidence" the statute allows. Due process requires a liberty interest while equal protection 
does not. State v. Reed, 107 Id. 162, 686 P2d 842 ( Ct. App. 1984 ). 
The Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the US Constitution is designed to 
assure that those persons similarly situated with respect to governmental action are treated alike. 
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 US 432, 439 (1985). The same protection is 
afforded under the Idaho Constitution. State v. Missamore, 119 Id. 27,33; 803 P2d 528, 534 (1990). 
Selective or discriminatory enforcement or application of a statute may amount to an equal 
protection violation under the state and federal constitutions if the challenger shows a deliberate plan 
of discrimination based on some unjustifiable classification. A "class of one" may state an equal 
protection claim ifhe or she was intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and 
the difference in treatment fails to satisfy the requisite level of scrutiny. Village of Willowbrook v. 
Olech, 528 US 562,564, (2000)(per curiam): Anderson v. Spalding, 137 Id 509,514, 50 P3d 1004, 
1009 (2002). Mr. Hem may be a class of one or there may be many more. Counsel for Mr. Hern has 
had other clients treated in the same manner, one client won his ALS hearing, but he still had to 
suffer the loss of his license because the hearing was not held in a timely manner. 
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In the alternative, if there is no equal protection violation, the hearing officer has made this 
decision to treat Mr. Hem differently in violation of l.C. § 67-5279(3). Either way, the decision to 
set the hearing outside the mandatory 20 day period violated Mr. Hem's rights and was not justified 
on this record. Mr. Hern did not invite error by asking for subpoenas allowed by LC. § 18-8002A. 
The court must set aside the hearing officer's decision and remand to the Department with 
an order to set aside the license suspension. 
VII. 
CONCLUSION 
ISPFS has failed to follow the statutory mandate of LC.§ 18-8002A regarding "rule" making 
and thus the breath testing system in Idaho fails. l.C. § 67-5279 mandates a reversal because this 
action of the agency was unconstitutional, was beyond statutory authority and was arbitrary . In 
addition, the failure to have the ALS hearing within the 20 day time frame mandated by the 
legislature violated Mr. Hem's due process rights, no hearing in a meaningful time or in a 
meaningful manner. An equal protection violation has also occurred. If one reads enough of the 
ALS hearing officers' decisions one will see that they treat the driver as the enemy. Almost any 
thing will be done to prevent a driver from winning at an ALS hearing. The hearing officer's failure 
to issue subpoenas in a timely fashion contributed to the delay. There was no good cause in this case 
as the "cause" was simply generated by the hearing officer's failure to act. 
Since the hearing officer made no sort of record regarding good cause and didn't have a 
hearing, the Court can also find that the decision to expand the hearing past the twenty (20) days and 
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thirty (30) days limit is not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. 
The Court must find that the license suspension was improper and enter an order directing 
ITD to vacate the license suspension for Mr. Hem and send the matter back to the Department with 
instructions to set aside the suspension. 
DATED this day of December, 2014. 
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day of December, 2014, a true copy 
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Faxed 
Hand delivered to: 
Edwin L. Litteneker 
Special Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
P.O. Box 321 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
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CLARK and FEENEY, LLP 
By _____________ _ 
Charles M. Stroschein, a member of the firm 
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Attorneys for Appellant 
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EXHIBIT A 
IDAPA 11-IDAHO STATE POLICE 
11.03.01 - RULES GOVERNING ALCOHOL TESTING 
DOCKET NO. XX-XXXX-XXXX (OAR will assign) 
NOTICE OF RULEMAKING - TEMPORARY AND PROPOSED RULE 
EFFECTIVE DATE: The effective date of the temporary rule is September 2, 2014. 
AUTHORITY: In compliance with Sections 67-5221 (I) and 67-5226, Idaho Code, notice is hereby given that this 
agency has adopted a temporary rule, and proposed rulemaking procedures have been initiated. The action is 
authorized pursuant to Section 67-2901, Idaho Code. 
PUBLIC HEARING SCHEDULE: Public hearing(s) concerning this rulemaking will be scheduled if requested in 
writing by twenty-five (25) persons, a political subdivision, or an agency, not later than October 14, 2014. 
The hearing site(s) will be accessible to persons with disabilities. Requests for accommodation must be made not 
later than five (5) days prior to the hearing, to the agency address below. 
DESCRIPTIVE SUMMARY: The following is the required finding and concise statement of its supporting 
reasons for adopting a temporary rule and a nontechnical explanation of the substance and purpose of the proposed 
rulemaking: 
This rule adds current standard operating procedures published by Idaho State Police Forensic Services (ISPFS) for 
alcohol analysis and breath testing to administrative rule. These rules have previously been part of the standard 
operating procedure documents published by ISPFS for use in court testimony. 
The following procedures will be added to administrative rule: 
• Breath alcohol instrument training requirements for operators and specialists; 
• Breath alcohol instrument performance verification and calibration requirements and rules; 
• Breath alcohol testing requirements and procedures; 
• Alcohol laboratory approval and operational standards; 
• Minor in possession/minor in consumption (MIP/MIC) testing methods; and 
• Passive testing procedures. 
TEMPORARY RULE JUSTIFICATION: Pursuant to Section(s) 67-5226(l){a), Idaho Code, the Governor has 
found that temporary adoption of the rule is appropriate for the following reasons: 
The need for the temporary rule change is due to ongoing criminal cases and appeals in the Idaho judicial system to 
suppress blood alcohol results based on the current process of having the rules governing breath alcohol testing in 
ISP Forensic Services' Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) rather than administrative rule. If the breath alcohol 
results are suppressed by the courts because of the current wording, DUI cases with breath test results would not be 
able to be prosecuted in Idaho. Not prosecuting DUI cases presents a significant public safety threat. 
FEE SUMMARY: The following is a specific description of the fee or charge imposed or increased: NIA 
FISCAL IMPACT: The following is a specific description, if applicable, of any negative fiscal impact on the state 
general fund greater than ten thousand dollars($ l0,000) during the fiscal year: N/ A 
NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING: Pursuant to Section 67-5220(2), Idaho Code, negotiated rulemaking was not 
conducted because there is no change to the process for alcohol testing, the change is merely adding the current 
standard operation procedure to administrative rule. 
INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE: Pursuant to Section 67-5229(2)(a), Idaho Code, the following is a brief 
synopsis of why the materials cited are being incorporated by reference into this rule: 
There is one incorporation by reference that continues in this rule. It did not need to be updated in this revision. The 
reference is a federal registry document listing the breath testing instruments in compliance/conformance with 
Department of Transportation regulations. The instruments approved in Idaho must be on the conforming products 
list. 
ASSISTANCE ON TECHNICAL QUESTIONS, SUBMISSION OF WRITTEN COMMENTS: For assistance 
on technical questions concerning the temporary and proposed rule, contact Matthew Garnette, Director of Forensic 
Services at (208) 884-7217. 
Anyone may submit written comments regarding the proposed rulemaking. All written comments must be directed 
to the undersigned and must be delivered on or before October 21, 2014. 
DATED this 28th day of August, 2014. 
Colonel Ralph W. Powell, Director 
Idaho State Police 
700 S. Stratford Dr., Meridian, ID 83642 
(208) 884-7003/(208) 884-7090 
EXHIBITB 
Garnette, Matthew 
From: 
Sent: 
To: 
Subject: 
Dennis Stevenson [Dennis.Stevenson@adrn.idaho.gov] 
Wednesday, July 09, 2014 11 :53 AM 
Garnette, Matthew 
RE: Nauert ruling 
UnfortL:nateiy, t think Judge Stegner got it (ght. The SOP manual is not an :nternal n1anagerrent Cocurnen~ per se. A,s 
the judge pointed out, the SOP does affect the ru:es of evidence \Nhich 1 !n tur·n, affect the rights of the pub:ic. 
Because the SOP is not incorporated by referer:ce., it does not have the ~Drce and effect of lavv. One cf the 
a ruie is the practice or procedure requirements of an ngency., and, in this casef these procedures affect the private 
rights of the pub!ic or the ;;rocedures available t.'J the public and, as such~ mu:;;t be put into ru'.2 to be enforc;~ab!e. 
That's my 2 cents ,North. 
Best Re~;a,ds, 
Dennis Stevenson 
State Administrative Rules Coordinator 
Dept of Administration 
State of Idaho 
208.332.1822 
208-332-1892 fax 
of 
Ccn.fdenrfalfty Staternent: This ele~troric mesSO[Je corta/r,s infornn;tion frorn ihe Office of rhe Adtniristrctive Rules Cooro':notorf Department of 
Adtr:inistrotion1 and is confidential Ot privileged. The ir.f·ornlatlon is intended soiely for the use oj rhe indfvidua:(:sj or enti~y(ies} norned abov-£. tf you 
hcve recei•1ed this e-rn(Jf/ ir. er.re.Jr, p:'ease norij:l ~15 inrmeJ:cte!y by c2i,:,r:::hone at. 208~332· 1820, i:;;r f:·y e-:r;oi! rep.!/~ and delete the messa~1e. Th:;r;k 
you. 
From: Garnette, Matthew [rnailto:matthew.garnette@isp.idaho.gov] 
Sent: Tuesday, July 08, 2014 10:12 PM 
To: Dennis Stevenson 
Subject: Nauert ruling 
have? are \<:.rv critica! that 
; the breath 
them. There are policy and procedure type things in those documents. I have also included a link to our website so you 
can look at the SOPs we have in this discipline. I am most interested in your thoughts on agency rules versus agency 
policies & pr·ocedures (as we discussed at our meeting). It is a tric!<y discipline because we basically set the rules for how 
alcohol testing is to be done in Idaho. I would love to have a discussion with you---afte1· you (or someone there) has the 
opportunity to review these documents. 
httr,i://www.isp.idaho.gov/forensics/documents/currentAMs/Breath%20Alcohol/6.0%20ldaho%20Breath%20Alcohol%2 
0Standard%20Operating%20Procedure%20rev%205.pdf 
Matthew Garnette, IV1.S., C.P.M. 
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Fifty-fourth Legislature 
( 
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
HOUSE BILL NO. 284 
BY TRANSPORTATION AND DEFENSE COMMITTEE 
AN ACT 
First Regular Session - 1997 
RELATING TO DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE; AMENDING SECTION 18-8002A, IDAHO 
CODE, TO ADD DEFINITIONS, TO REQUIRE PEACE OFFICERS TO INFORM DRIVERS AT 
THE TIME OF EVIDENTIARY TESTING OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFUSING TO SUBMIT 
TO· OR FAILING AN EVIDENTIARY TEST, TO PROVIDE RULEMAKING AUTHORITY OF THE 
DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, TO INCREASE THE TIME IN WHICH A PEACE OFFI-
CER MUST FORWARD A NOTICE OF SUSPENSION, TO ADD CODE REFERENCES, TO AUTHO-
RIZE PEACE OFFICERS TO SUBMIT A DUPLICATE COPY OF THE ORIGINAL TEST 
RESULTS WITH THEIR STATEMENTS, AND TO PROVIDE THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER 
WHICH TEMPORARY DRIVING PRIVILEGES WILL BE ISSUED; AMENDING SECTION 
18-8002B, IDAHO CODE, TO STAY ENFORCEMENT OF SECTION 18-8002A, IDAHO CODE, 
UNTIL JANUARY 1, 1998 AND TO CORRECT A CODE REFERENCE; REPEALING SECTION 
18-8002B, IDAHO CODE; AMENDING SECTION 49-326, IDAHO CODE, TO REDUCE FROM 
TWENTY-ONE DAYS TO TWENTY DAY.S, THE TIME THAT HEARINGS MUST BE HELD AFTER 
RECEIPT OF THE REQUEST, AUTHORIZING HEARING OFFICERS TO EXTEND THE HEARING 
DATE BY TEN DAYS FOR GOOD CAUSE SHOWN, AUTHORIZING HEARING OFFICERS TO 
ADMINISTER OATHS AND TO MAKE A TECHNICAL CORRECTION; AMENDING SECTION 
49-328, IDAHO CODE, TO ALLOW THE DEPARTMENT TO COLLECT ONLY ONE FEE PER 
REINSTATEMENT; AMENDING SECTION 49-330, IDAHO CODE, TO ALLOW DRIVERS WHOSE 
DRIVER'S LICENSES HAVE BEEN CANCELLED, SUSPENDED, DISQUALIFIED, OR 
RESTRICTED TO FILE A PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW; AND PROVIDING AN EFFEC-
TIVE DATE. 
Be It Enacted By The Legislature Of The State Of Idaho: 
24 SECTION 1. That Section 18-8002A, Idaho Code, be, and the same 1s hereby 
25 amended to read as follows: 
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18-8002A. TESTS OF DRIVER FOR ALCOHOL CONCENTRATION, PRESENCE OF DRUGS OR 
OTHER INTOXICATING SUBSTANCES -- SUSPENSION UPON FAILURE OF TESTS. (1) Defini-
tions. As used in this section: 
(a) "Actual physical control" means being in the driver's position of a 
motot vehicle with the motor running -0r with the vehi~le moving. 
(b) 11Administrative hearing" means a hearing conducted by a hearing offi-
w to determine whether a suspension imposed by the provisions of this 
section should be vacated or sustained. 
(be) 11Department 11 means the Idaho transportation department and, as the 
co;text requires, shall be construed to include any agent of the depart-
ment designated by rule as hereinafter provided. 
(e.9) 11 Director" means the director of the Idaho transportation depart-
ment. 
(e) "Evidentiary testing" means a procedure or test or series of proce-
dures or tests utilized to determine the concentration of alcohol or the 
presence of drugs or otlier intoxicating substances in a person, including 
additional testing authorized by subsection (6) of this section. An evi-
dentiary test for alcohol concentration shall be based on a formula of 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF l{OOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plamtiff/Respondcnt, 
vs. 
MARTIN EUGENB NAUERT, 
Defendi:u1t/ Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
----··------ ______ ) 
CnBo No. CV-2013-1017H 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
In this case; the defendant, Martin-Eugene Nauert, entered a conditional 
guilty plea to Driving Under the Influence of Aleohol, a misdemeanor, in violation of 
LC. § 18-8001. Naucrt now appeals to this Cout't, challenging the Magistrate 
Jud~e's denials of his Motion to Suppress and his Motion in Limine. The case was 
submitted on the brief of Nauert without oral argument as authorized by I./\..R. 
37(e). For reasons that have never been explained, tho State did not respond t.o 
Naul:lrt's brief. 
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BACKGROUND 
The State and Naue1·t stipulated to a brief Btatement of facts: Nauer1, 
consented to an evidentiary breath test for the p1·escnce of alcohol in hh-., body after 
being provided with an administtative license s1.u:,pension (ALS) warning. Naucrt 
challenged the com;titutional validity of his consent via a Motion to Suppre1:,1,, He 
also filed a Motion in Limine challenging the validity of the standard operating 
procedures (SOPs) and manuals created by t;he Idaho State Police (ISP) to govern 
evidentiary testing for alcohol ai1d the foundations for the admissibility of those test 
results. 
The 'Magistrate Judge denied Nauert's motions. As a re~ult of his challenge8 
being 1·ejectcd, Nauert e11t;ered a conditional guilty plea and appealed the 
Magistrate fJudgc's decisions to this Court. 
LAW 
A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is reviewed on a bifurcated 
Btandanl. State v. Wheeler, 14B Idaho 364, 233 P.3d 1286 (Ct. ApJL 2010). FindingH 
of fact supported by 1mbstantial evidence ar.e accepted, but the reviewing court 
considers the application of constitutional principles de novo. Id., 149 Idaho at 370~ 
238 P.3d at 1292. 
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that citizens shall 
be secm:e from unreai:,onahle searches and seizures, and that no wartants shall be 
issued except upon a showing of probable cause. U.S, CONST. AMEND. IV. Article[, 
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§ 17 of the Idaho Constitution provides similar, although some would argue greater, 
p1·otcction against unl'easonable searches. 
Consent is a well-l·ecognized exception to the Fourth Amendme11t 
requiremont for a search warrant. Wheeler, 149 Idaho at 370, 233 P.8d nt 1292. 
Under Idaho Code§ 18-8002(1), every oporator of a motor vehicle in the t::itate of 
Idaho is deemed to have given consent to evidentiary testing for alcohol 
concentration.1 This is commonly 1·eforred to ai:, implied consent. Among other 
provisions, the implied consent statute authorizes the imposition of a $250 penalty 
and t,he suspension of one's ch·iving privileges for• one year for refu1ml to submit to 
· testing. I.C. § 18-8002. Both the financial penalty and the loss of driving p1·ivileg-es 
a1·e characterized as civil penalties. A driver may also be shown to freely and 
voluntarily consent to an cvidentiary test, f'mch as a breath test, in light of all the 
circumstances. State v. Varie, 135 Idaho 818; 852, 26 P.3d 31, 35 (2001). 
1 LC. § 18-8002(1) st.ateR: 
Any person who drives or is in physic.al conh'ol of a motor vehicle in this state shall 
be deemed Lo have givon hi!:l <..,·nnsent to evidontia:ry tesLing for concentration of 
alcohol as defined in section 18-8004, Idaho Code, and to have given his cons<mt. to 
cvidentfa.ry testing for t.he presence of drugs or other intoxicating suhstances, 
provided that su(:h testing is administered a~ the request of a peace officer having 
roasonable grounds to believe that person has heen drivin~ or in actual physical 
cont1•ol of a motor vehicle in violation of the provision11 of section_ VHW.04, T_daho 
Code, or section 18-8006, Idaho Code. 
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ANALYSIS 
The Magistrate Judge Did Not Err in Denying Nauert's Motion to 
Suppress, Because Nauert's Consent to Breath Testing Was Not Coerced 
Nauert argues that his consent was unconstitutional becam:,e he waR coerced 
into agreeing to have his breath tested for alcohol. He contends he was forced to 
agree to the testing because of the onerous penalties he faced if he we1·e to 1·cfuse 
testing. The ALS advisory informs the dtiver, among other things: "You arc 
required by law to take one or more evidentia1·y test(s) to determine the 
concentration of alcohol or p1·esenco of drugs or other intoxicating substances in 
your body." Following this admonition ii, a list of ciuil penalties that may be 
imposed against a driver for his refusal to undetgo testing. (As noted, these include 
a fine of up to $250 and loss of one's drivi.rig privilegeH fo1• one year. The ALS 
advisory does not advise the drive1· that the test result8, if (;hey i:;how an alcohol 
concentration of .08 or above, may be introduced in a criminal tdal and that such a 
showing would result in the driver being found to have been operating the vehicle 
while undet the influence of alcohol. J.C. § 18-8004(1)(a).) 
Nauert m·gnei:; that Missouri u. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013) requires a 
different analyi:;is of what warni11g is mquircd regarding hifi ctiminal case. Nm1e1·t 
seems to argue that because the implied consent advisory does not advise the driver 
of the critninal implications of taking the test and failing it, that it cannot be 
considered a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver for criminal putpm,es. 
In McNeely, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that: 
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States have a broad range of legal t.ools to enforce thefr clrunk-driving 
laws and to secu1'e BAC evidence without undertaking· warrantless 
. -
nonconsensual blood draws. For example, all 50 States have adopted 
implied consent laws that require motorists, as a condition of operating 
a mot,or vehicle within the Stato, to consent to BAC testing if they are 
nnosted or otherwise detained on suspicion of a drunk-dtiving offense. 
Id. at 156fi. 
The McNeely Cou1·t also cited Sou.th Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983). 
In Neville; the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed ce1tafr1 aspects of South Dakota's 
implied consent law. Id. The Supreme Court found that the law allowed a one-year 
c1:v,:l 1·evocation of a driver's license for refusal to allow testing after the drivm was 
given an opportunity for H hearing. Id., 459 U.S. at f>HO. The Supreme Court then 
stated succinctly: "Such penalty for refusing to take blood-alcohol test is 
1 :, 
unquestionably legitimate, assuming appropriate procedural protections." id. 
However, the U.S. Supreme Com't further stated in a footnote: 
Even though the officers did not specifically advise respondent that the 
teat results could be used against him in court, no one would seriou13ly 
contend that his foilu1·e to warn would make the test results 
inadmissible, had respondent choi;;en to submit to the test .... 
While the State did not actually warn respondent that the test results 
could he used against him [in a criminal trial), we hold that iiuch fl 
failure to warn was not the sort of implicit promiBe to fo1·ego tisc of 
evidence t,ha.t would unfairly r't.rick" respondent; if the evidence were 
hi.ter offered against him at trial .... 
Id., 459 U,S. at 565 n. 16, 566. 
Given t;hat McNeely specifically refe:tenees Neville, it does not require the 
invalidation of t,he consent to bt·eath test in a criminal case. ThiR Court is troubled 
by the advisory _warning's failure to inentio:q. thf!t the bt'eath test administered may 
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be used in a criminal prosecution. Were it not for the controlling precedent of South 
Da,kola u. Neville, and the U.S. Supreme Court)s tacit recognition of the continuing 
vrnbil~t,y of Neville, this Court wonld find that Nauerfs eonse:nt was invalidated by a 
failure to wa1·n him of the crim1:nal consequences of taking and foiling the breath 
test.ii It. is not: possible to conclude that Nauert's consent was knowing, intelligent, 
or voluntary absent t:he footnote in Neville. Howevet\ this Court is constrained by 
the decifiion of the United States Snpreme Com·t in Neville, whete the justices 
determined that officers need not specifically warn a driver that; alcohol test results 
may be used against him in a criminal trial. Neville, 459 U.S. at 565 n, Ht As a 
result, this Court must conclmle that Nauerf s consent was valid fot the purposes of 
criminal prosecution} and the Magistrate Judge did not err in denying the motion to 
RUpprOSS. 
The Magistrate Judge Erred In Denying Naucrt's Motion in Limi11e, 
Because the State Did Not Offer the Breath Testing Evidence Through a 
Valid Alternative to Expert Testimony Under the Rules of Evidence 
The gravamen of Nauert's motion in liminc is that the SOPs m1d manuals, 
formulated by the ISP to implement the statute8 authorizing breath-testing and its 
admissibility in eourt, have never been adopted as rules. Becaiu,e of t,he ISP's 
failure to promulgate rules, the procedures required to establish the reliability of 
the -breath testing were not fulfilled and the magistrate judge should have rejected 
J It should be pointed out that a driver in Nauert's situation is not entitled to the advice of coun~d under 
the circumstances. Matter of McNeely, 119 Tdaho 182,189,804 P.2d 911, 9HI (Ct. App. 1990); J.C.§ 18-
8002(2). As a result, Naµert was never informed of the legal consequences he faced in a crimmal 
prosecution and ht) was deprived of the ability to be apprised of the consequences by j:lis lawye1·. 
Consequently, it is h,ud to understand how Nuuerfs consent was knowiug, intelligent, or voluntary. 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 6 
rtU!lL U!!KJIUVV!I rc:1,1e. u, 1u LJctLe, /JI/LUI"+ 1.Uf.1/ r1v1 
tho results of Na.uert's breath testing when challenged through the motion in 
liminc. This Court agrees that whateve:r else can be said of the SOPs and manuals 
they are not '~rules" and therefore d.o not have the effect of rules. Consequently, the 
magistrate judge erred when he denied Nauert's motion _1n limine. 
Idaho Code§§ 18-8002A(3) and 18-8004(4) Jmrportcdly exercise the state 
legii,lat,ure's power to regulate the admission of alcohol testing evidence in DUI 
cases. 3 These statutes confer upon tho ISP, an executive branch agency, t,he 
"rosponsib1lity fo1· authorizing alcohol content testing ptocedures ... " State v. 
:~ LC § 18~8002A(3) stat.c-s: 
Rulemakjng authority of U1e Idaho st."ltc police. The Idaho state police may, pursuant lo 
chapter 52, title 67, Idaho C9dc, pre11cribe by rule: 
(a) What testing is required lo complete evklentiary testing under this section; and 
(b) What calibration or checking of testing equipment must be performed to comply with 
the dcpartrnent1s requirements. Any 1•ules of the Idaho st.ate police shall be in accordance 
with the following: a lest for alcohol (:oncentration in breath a:. defined in section 18-8004, 
Idaho Code, and subsection (l)(e) of thir; .-,ection will be valid for the purposes of this 
section if the bre<'!th akohol testh1g instmment wa.-. approved for tcstine by the Idaho 
state police in acconlance with .section 18-8004, ldaho Code, at any time within ninely 
(90) days before the evidenliary lest:iug. A test for alcohol concentratiqn in blood or urine 
as defined in section 18-8004, Idaho Cod(•, that is reported by the Idaho state police or by 
any laboratory ,:1pprnved by the Idaho state police to perform this test will be valid for 
lhe pu1·poses of th.is section. 
I.C § 18-8004(4) states: 
l1or purposes of this chapter, an evidentiary test for alcohol concentration shall be based 
upon a formuhi of L,rams of alcohol per one hundred (100) cubk centimeters of blood, per 
two hundred ten (210) liters of breath m sixty-seven (67) milliliters of urine. Analysis of 
blood, urine or breath for the purpmJe of del:ermi.nh1g the alcohol concentration ~hall be 
perfornu~d by a laboratory operated by the Idaho state police or by a labora.tory 
approved by the Idaho slate police under the provisions of approval and certification 
sta:ndards to be set by that department, or by any other method approved by the Idaho 
state police. Notwithstanding t1ny other provjsion of Law or rule of court, tbe resulls of 
any test for akoJ10l corn::entration and records relating to calibration, approval, 
certification or quality control performed by 1:1. labomlory operated or approved by the 
Idaho state police or by any other method approved by t11c Idaho state police shall bl:! 
admissible h1 any p1·oceeding in this state without the necessity of producinB" a witness to 
establish the reliabWity of the Lesting procedure f9r cxam_ination. 
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Besaw, 155 Idaho 134, _-_, 306 P.3d 219, 227-2H (Ct. App. 2013) (discussing 
State u. Belli 115 Idaho 36, 764 P.2d 113 (Ct. App. 1988)). 
Under this statuto1·y duty and authority, the ISP has generated 
administi·ative rules, the SOPs, and the breath testing manuals. The ISP has 
ptomulg·atcd IDAPA 1L03.01.014.03, which reads afl follows: 
Breath tests shall be administered in conformity with standards 
established by the department. Standards shall be developed fot each 
type of breath testing instrument used in Idaho, and such standards 
shall be isrmed in the form of analytical methods and standnrd 
ope1·ating procedures. [Effective] (4-7-11) 
The SOPs and mainmls are not contained in JDAPA 11.03.01. Neither are 
they fonnally incorporated by reference in that chapter.4 No court has ever 
determined that the SOP8 and manuals constitute "rules') for purposes of the APA. 
Besm.v, 155 Idaho at IL 2, SOG P.3d at 225, .225 n. 2 ("[Tlhe Idaho State 
Police agency is charged with prescribing by rule approved equipment for testing 
b:renth alcohol content and standa1·ds for administration of such teBtf::l. We have 
treated [the SOPs and manuals] as 'rules) for the J)Ul'posc of judicial review because 
the parties have done so and because they constitute the only materials by which 
the ISP has purportedto authorize testing insti·uments and methods .... We have 
11ot, however, held that these SOPs and manuals actually constitute 'rules' or that 
-1 On the 0U1er hand, under IDAPA 11.03.01.004 the ISP has formally incorporated a list of nmforming 
breath testing devices whkh have been approved by the ISP. This action superseded the dC'ci~io-n of the 
Court uf Appeals in Alford, which said that approval of brealh testing <levkes was not an .ig<s~ncy action 
subject to the r~qulrements of the APA State v. Alford, l m; Idaho 595, 597-98, H:l P.3d 139, 141-42 
(Ct. App. 200t1). 
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the ISP has 'prescribed by rule) testing instruments and method1, as cont,emplatccl 
by [statute]; that.issue has nevet been presented to this Court."). 
In Besaiv, the Court of Appeals reco~nized that the1·e was "tl'Oubling 
information about the manner in which the SOPs for breath testing have been 
developed or amended ... " Besaw, 306 P .3d at 229. The Court of Appeals found 
that certain "cmailB and memos to and from ISP [were] distu:tbing [because they] 
lacked any apparent regard for the way proposed changes could affect the validity of 
the tests." Id. The Besaw court disapproved of tho apparent objective of ccrtam ISP 
personnel to ''thwa1·t all possible defense challenges to the admission of breath tests 
tather than to adopt standanls that will maximize the accut·acy of tests upon which 
individuals may he convicted of serious crimes and deprived of their liberty.'' Id. 
The court alt=m noted that the1·e seemed to be "a conscious avoidance of flny 
opportunity for suggestions or ctitiques from persons outside the law enforcement 
community." Id. In a footnote, the Court of ApJ)eals explained that avoidance of 
scrutiny for the SOPs would be impossible if they had been promulgated acco1·ding 
to the APA. Id. at 229 n. 5. 
Under the APA, an administrative rule implementing a statute m1.rnt undergo 
a specific process to become final, and given the force ancl effect oflaw. The SOPs 
and manuals have not bocn promulgntecl to comport with APA rulemaking' 
requirements. The ISP p1·ovides no notice in the administrative bulletin before the 
SOPs and manuals are adopted (as required by LC.§§ 67-5220 and 67-5221); the 
ISP accepts no public comments and holds no public hearing on tho SOPs (al':'! 
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mqufrcd by I.C. § 67"5222); the ISP does not, submit the SOPs to a11y legislative 
review (as required by LC.§§ 67-5223 and 67-5291). Certainly, :from a procedurnl 
· and legal standpoint, the SOPs and manuals are not administrative rules. 
· Given that the SOPs and manuals have never been efitnhlishcd as "rules," the 
question facing this Court is a matter of first impression: Are the SOPs and 
mnntrnls valid authority which enable the admiesion of Nauert's breath testing 
without expert testimony? To answer that inquiry, this Com·t musL aRk the 
unavoidable question of what; t;he SOPs and manuals 1:n·e: Since they are not rules, 
wh~it legal effect do they have? 
Because the SOPs and mantrnls are not rules, they cannot be given the force 
and effect of law g-enerally ascribed to administrative rules. J\tfead) 117 Idaho at 
664, 791 P.2d at 414. The SOPs are, at most, internal guideline8 or standards. See 
Service Employee8 lnt'l Union, Local 6 v. Idaho Dept. of Health & Welfare, lOG 
, Idaho 75H, 75fJ, 683 P.2d 404, 407 (H)84) (reaffirmed in Nation v. State, Dept. of 
Correction, 144 Idaho 177, 158 P.3d !)53 (2007)). Ae int,e1·nal guidelines, the SOPfi 
and .munuals may be changed with impunity by the ngency head whenever hH 
choosea, and nre not vetted by anyone other than the ISP. Internal guidelines do 
not have the force and effect of law. Id. They can only govern the internal 
management of an agency and cannot affect p1·ivate rights or pruc<~dures available 
to the public. Id. As H ·result, internal guideline8 arc also incopoble of affecting the 
Rules of Evidence. 
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The APA provides no saving support for the authority of the SOPs and 
manuals. As defined by l.C. § 67~5201(21), a "standai·d" is: 
[A] n11-111ual, guideline, criterion, specification, requirement 
measurement or other authoritative principle providing a moliel 01· 
pattern in comparison with which the correctness or app1·opriatencss of 
specified actions, practices or procedures may be determined. 
Without incorporation by reforcnce and in compliance with the APA, the SOPs and 
manuals have no legal effect beyond tho management of the ISP. At moBt, the 
SOPi,, and manuals a1·0 unincorporated standards, manuals, and internal 
guidehnes, nothing more. As a result they have no power to give cffoct to LC. §§ 18-
8002A(3) and 18-8004(4). It is inexplicnble that such an insubstantial basis could 
divert the course of the judiciary in the manner it has. Nevertheless, that is where 
we now ni·e. 
What the ISP has done is, in effect, con8truct an end run around the AP A and 
ultimately the Rules of Evidence. If the ISP were required to follow rule making 
procedures, the SOPs and manuals would at least be subject to outside scrutiny. To 
the extent they are arbitrary or capricious, they could.be r,;,truck down. LC.§ 67-
527B. vVhile the state legislature is not required to pi-escdbe standards Lo control 
an agency's rulemaking discretion, the legislntion itself 01' the agency's intc1·nal 
guidelines should provide "meaningful safegum·cL.;; against arbitrary decision 
making" such as a right to a hearing or juclicial review. Sun Valley Co. v. City of 
Sun Valle,y, 109 Idaho 424, 4i8, 708 P.2d 147, 151 (1985) (abrogat,ed on other 
gtouncls). As noted by the Idaho Court of Appeals, in Besaw, there is "troubling 
information about the mnnner in which the SOPs for breath testing have beBn 
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developed or umended ... " Besaw, 155 Idaho at_, 306 P.Bd at 22H. This 
conclusion is especially disconcerting when it is remembered that, t,he results of the 
breath test effectively create stl'ict liabilitv for a driver whose breath test shows an 
. ~ 
alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more. The result of where we are today is that there 
is 110 8cientific support fol' the processes to be employed in administering a test t.hat 
holds a driver Htrict.ly liable for driving unde1· the influence. Not only is this result 
prohibited by our Rules of Evidence, it also fails to meet the requirement of 
fundamental fairness. 
As the process currently stands, thete are no "meaningful safeguards" to 
ensm~e that the SOPs ate nejther odlitrary nor capricjous. (In fact, the Court of 
Appeals has cast serious doubt on t;he SOPs and man:uaJs because they seem to be· 
promulgated in a way to avoid scrutiny.· Besaw, 155 Idaho at_ i 30G P.3d at 229.) 
There is no indication whatsoever that the legislature itsolf exercises any oversight 
of the development of the SOPs and manuals. Without overnight, the1·e is no 
agsurance that the SOPs and manuals are anything other than self-serving. 
Given that tlle SOPfi and manuals are not rules, they cannot supplant the 
Rules of Evidence. (They also cannot abrogate the separation ofpowet'8 doctl'ine or 
the requirement of due process, hut those are other issues.) I.RE. 1102 makes it 
. clear that statuteR and rules cannot affect the Rules of Evidence: "Statutory 
provisions and rules governing the admissibility of evidenCl=!; to the extent they m·e 
evidentinry and to the extent that they are in conflict with aJ)plicablc rules of Idaho 
Rules of Evidence, are of no force or effect." With that as a i,tai-t;ing point, it is a 
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fortiori that the SOPs and manuals, which are neither statutes nor rules, could 
somehow effect a change of the rules of evidence in the way sought, If F.tatutcs and 
rules cannot alte1· the Ruleri of Evidence, something that has never been 
promulgated as a rule Burely cannot affect the Rules of Evidence. 
The aclmissibility of evidence is a matter within the inherent judicial iJowe1· of 
the Idaho Supreme Court to establish rules and procedures. Idaho Const., Art. V, 
§§ 2, 13; LC.§ 1-212 (recognizing the judiciary's i11herent powers); and I.R.Jt 1102 
(which reflects the judiciary's primacy when it comes to matter8 of evidence: 
"Statutory provisions and 1·ules governing the admissibility of evidence, to the 
extent they are evidentiary and to the extent that they are in conflict with 
applicable rules of Idaho Rules of Evidence, are of no force or effect.~'), The 
legiidature has no power to deprive the judiciary of its powers, but may l'Cgulate by 
law, when necessiu:y, the methods of proceeding in the cxcrcjse of those 1wwers of 
all the courts inferior to the Supreme Com-t, so long as it does not conflict wit'h the 
state constitution. Idaho Const., Al't. V, § 13. The Rules of Evidence may only be 
amended l)y the Supreme Coiu.·(;, Art. V, § 13 does not give the legislature the 
ability to modi(y those Rules of Evidence. Indeed, "to the extent, th11t the rule [of 
evidence] places greater strictures upon the use of such evidence thnn does the 
statute1 the 1·ulc must gove1·11." State v. Rick,s; 122 Idaho 856, 860, 840 P.2d 400, 
404: (Ct. App. 1992). 
The Cmut of Appeals has, somewhat inexplicably, concluded that I.C. § J 8-
8002A(3) simply pt'ovidcs an alternative method to satisfy the foundational 
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requirements fol' scientific testimony in the Rules of Evidence. State v. Nicli~erson, 
182 Idaho 406, 410-11, 973 P.2d 758, 762-63 (Ct;, App. 1999). However, the car;e 
law upon which Nickerson 1·elies makes it clear that the statutes havo not done 
away with foundational requirements. See State v. Bell, 115 Idaho BG, 30, 764 P.2d 
113, 117 (Ct. App. 1988): 
The acceptance by the Legislature of test proeedures as designated by 
the Idaho Dcpai·tment of Health and Welfare clocs not wholly eliininote 
the need of establishing foundational requirements for a test result. 
This is required even in light of the legislative directive to ut;ili'l..e an 
expedient means to admit such evidence. The adoption of the 
par'ticular test p1·ocedure merely recognizes the validity and 1·elinbility 
of that particular accepted test. It must still be established at trial 
that those procedures which ensm·c the reliability aml in turn the 
accuracy of the teflt have been met. 
What has been happening with the SOPs and manuals as of late is more than just a 
legislative fiuhstitute for scientific reliability. The fact of the matter i1:1 that the ISP 
is now vested with the unilateral powe1· to prescl'ibe the admission of breath testing 
evidencE• in Idaho's courts. As a result, this statute violates the separations of 
powers doctrine. Sta.te v. Moore, 150 Idaho 17, 20, 244 P.3d 161, 164 (2010) "The 
sepa1·ation of powers doctrine om bodies the concept that the three b1·anches of 
government, legislative, executive and judicial, should remain separate and distinct 
80 that each is able to operate independent}y." (quoting Sweeney v. Otter, lH) Idaho 
135, 139, 804 P .2d 308, 312 (1990)); Estep v. Conun 'rs of Boundary Connty, l~l 
Idaho 345, 347, 83t! P.2d 8fi2, 8G4 (1992) "The only exception to the separation of 
powers doctrine occurs where the exel'cise of another branch's powor is expressly 
dfrect;ed or permitted lJy the constitution." 
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It is uni,ettling to think that the ISP is allowed to draft SOPs and manuals 
given the force and effect of law without any oversight. This is tantamcmnt to n 
wholesale assignment of power to an executive branch agency, when the Supreme 
Court has said this is nn a1·ca solely goven1ed by the Court. It is axiomHtic that the 
le.gislatum is vested with the authority to make lawi.,, not the executive. Idaho 
Coi1st., Art. III,§ 1, Art. II; §1. It is even more 1.msettling to think that the ISP 
would be granted the power to dictate the procedural operationfi of the judicial 
branch. This is a prerogative the judiciary, nt least in the past, haB been unwilling 
to relinquish. R.E. W. Const. Co. v. Dist. Ct. of the Third Judicial Dist., 88 ldaho 
.426, 437-38) 400 P.2d 390, 397 (1965); fiee also, In re SRBA Cm,e No. 39576, 128 
Idaho 246, 255, 912 P.2d 614, 623 (19H5). 
This Court is unwilling to endorse the ISP's unche~ked exercise of power over 
the judicial process. The jlldiciary of this state "has consistently acted to protect 
against encroachment of one department of government on another." lvlead, l 17 
Idaho at 669, 791 P.2d at 419. In deciding cases and controve1·sics the judiciary 
must he mindful of the ''endudng consequences upon the hnlanccd power structm·e" 
of out· democratic system. Id. (quoting the U.S. Supt·eme Court's opinion in 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sau1yer, :343 U.S. 579 (1952)). The ISP cannot 
unilatmally direct what foundation, if any, is 1·equircd for the admisBion of breath 
test evidence in Idttho'r:; courts. Yet the eurre11t system amounts to tho functional 
equivalent of a transfer of that authority. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasoni!l stated above, this Court concludes that the Magjst,t·ate Judge 
erred in overruling Nauert's challenge to the admissibility of Naucrt's breath test 
results without an adequate foundation being laid. Accordingly, tho Order Denying 
tho Motion Limine is reversed and the case remanded for furthe.t· proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
r~ 
Datecl this .$ day of tlnly 2014. 
~·(2A;s;;-.-
J~tegne1' 
District Judge 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 16 
I !UIII. Uilf\.llVVVII f a~c. IV/IU L.IOLC. {/f/L.U!-t I.U{.£1 l!Vi 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby certify thnt, full, true, complete, and cor1·ect copies of the fr)I'egoing 
order were delivered to: 
Jay Logsdon 
Deputy Public Defender 
208~446-1701 
Joel Ryan 
Post Falla P1·osecuting Attorney 
208•773-0214 
On this_ day of July 201Ll. 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
l ] Fax 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
r ] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
f ] Fax 
[ ] Hand De livery 
Deputy Clerk 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 17 
E HIBITE 
;,,. 
Idaho Standard Operating Procedure 
Breath Alcohol Testing 
Idaho State Police 
Forensic Services 
Idaho Breath Alcohol Standard Operating Procedure 
Issuing Authority---ISPFS Quality Manager 
Revision 0 Effective 8/20/2010 
P:ice 1 of 17 
Glossary 
Approved Vendor: A source/provider/manufacturer of an approved premixed alcohol simulator solution shall be explicitly 
approved as a vendor of premixed alcohol simulator solutions for distribution within Idaho. 
Breath Alcohol Test: A series of separate breath samples provided during a breath testing sequence. 
Breath Alcohol Testing Sequence: A sequence of events as detennined by the Idaho State Police Forensic Services, which 
may be directed by either the instrument or the operator, but not both, and may consist of air blanks, performance 
verification, internal standard checks, and breath samples. 
Breath Testing Specialist (BTS): An operator who has completed an advanced training class taught by an employee of the 
Idaho State Police Forensic Services. BTS certification is valid for 26 calendar months and expires on the last day of the 
26th month. 
Certificate of Analysis: A certificate stating that the premixed ethyl alcohol solutions used for performance verification have 
been tested and approved for use by the ISPFS. 
Certificate of Approval: A certificate stating that an individual breath alcohol testing instrument has been evaluated by the 
ISPFS and found to be suitable for forensic alcohol testing. The certificate bears the signature of an Idaho State Police 
Forensic Services Lab Manager, and the effective date of the instrument approval. 
Changeover Class: A training class for currently certified personnel during which they are taught theory, operation, and 
proper testing procedure for a new make or model of instrument being adopted by their agency. Breath Testing Specialists 
attend BTS training that qualifies them to perform BTS duties related to the instrument. 
Evidentiary Test: A breath test performed on a subject/individual for potential evidentiary or legal purposes. A distinction 
is made between evidentiary testing and community service or training tests performed with the instrument. 
Idaho State Police Forensic Services (ISPFS): Formerly known as the Bureau of Forensic Services, the ISPFS is dedicated 
to providing forensic science services to the criminal justice system of Idaho. ISPFS is the administrative body for the 
breath alcohol testing program per ID APA 11 .Q3 .QI . 
MIP/MIC: An abbreviation used to designate minor in possession or minor in consumption of alcohol. 
Operator Certification: The condition of having satisfied the training requirements for administering breath alcohol tests as 
established by the ISPFS. Operator certification is valid for 26 calendar months and expires on the last day of the 26th 
month. 
Operator: An individual certified by the ISPFS as qualified by training to administer breath alcohol tests. 
Operator Class: An JSPFS-approved training class for prospective or uncertified breath alcohol operators. Currently 
certified Breath Testing Specialists may teach operator classes. 
Performance Verification: A verification of the accuracy of the breath testing instrument utilizing a simulator and a 
perfonnance verification solution. Performance verification should be reported to three decimal places. While ISPFS uses 
the term performance verification, manufacturers and others may use a term such as "calibration check" or "simulator check." 
Performance Verification Solution: A premixed ethyl alcohol solution used for field performance verifications. The 
solution is provided by and/or approved by ISPFS. 
Recertification Class: A training class for currently certified personnel, completion of which results in uninterrupted 
continuation of their Operator or BTS status for an additional 26 months. 
Waiting Period/Monitoring Period/Deprivation Period/Observation Period: 15-minute period prior to administering a 
breath alcohol test, in which an officer monitors the test subject/individual. 
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SOP Section 
2 
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3.2.1 
2.1 
2.2 
2.1.2 
2.1.2 
2.1.2 
2.1 
2 
2.1.2 
2.1 
2 
2 
2 
2.1 
2.2 
1.6 
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Breath Alcohol Standard Operating Procedure 
List of Revisions 
Topic 
Delete reference to ALS 
0.02/0.20 solutions 
Valid breath tests 
Alco-Sensor calibration checks 
Intoxilyzer 5000 Calibration Checks 
Effective June, 1996 
0.003 agreement 
Operators may run calibration checks 
Re-run a solution within 24 hours 
All 3 solutions run within a 24-hour period 
All 3 solutions run within a 24-hour period 
Re-running of a solution 
All solutions run within a 48-hour period 
Reference to "three" removed 
All 3 solutions run within a 48-hour period 
More than three calibration solutions 
Solution values no longer called in to BFS 
Alco-Sensor and Intoxilyzer 5000 
calibration check 
Calibration checks for the Intoxilyzer 5000 
Name change, all references made to the 
Bureau of Forensic Services were changed to 
Idaho State Police Forensic Services. 
Record Management 
Deleted sections on relocating, repairing, recalibrating, 
and loaning of instruments from previous revision. 
Date of Revision 
June 1, 1995 
June l, 1995 
October 23, 1995 
May I, 1996 
May 1, 1996 
June 1, 1996 
July 1, 1996 
September 6, 1996 
September 6, 1996 
September 6, 1996 
September 26, 1996 
September 26, 1996 
Oct. 8, 1996 
September 26, 1996 
October 8, 1996 
April 1, 1997 
August 1, 1998 
February 11, 1999 
August 1999 
August 1, 1999 
August 1, 1999 
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1.2, 2.1, 2.2 
3 
1.6 
1,2, and 3 
2.1, 2.2 
2.2. I .1.2.2 
2.2.1.1.2.2 
2.1.2.1 and 2.2.4 
2.2.1.1.2.2 
1.2 
1.5 
2 
2.2 
2. 
Sections 1, 2, 3 
2.1.4, 2.2.3, 2.2.4, 2.2.5 
And2.2.10 
2.1.3, 2.1.4.1, 2.1.9 
Alco-Sensor and Intoxilyzer 5000 calibration checks 
Deleted sections on blood and urine samples 
for alcohol determination 
Operator certification record management 
Reformat numbering 
Requirement for running 0.20 simulator solution 
Changed 3-sample to "two print cards". 
Deleted "simulator port" and "two print cards". 
Simulator temperature changed from "should" 
to "must". 
Clarification of 0 .20 calibration checks. 
Added the Lifeloc FC20 
Deleted requirement that the new instrument 
utilize the same technology if the BTS is currently 
certified 
Modified the accepted range for simulator solutions to 
+/- 10%, eliminating the +/- 0.0 I provision. Added 
"Established target values may be different 
from those shown on the bottle label" 
Added Lifeloc FC20 calibration checks 
Intoxilyzer 5000 calibration is now section 2.3 
Modified to specifically allow use of the 0.20 
during subject testing 
General reformat for clarification. Combined 
Alcosensor and Lifeloc sections. Specifically, 
changed calibration requirement using the 0.20 
reference solution from four ( 4) checks to two (2). 
Clarification: a "calibration check" consists of a 
pair of samples in sequence and both samples 
must be within the acceptable range before 
proceeding with subject testing. A 0.20 solution 
should be replaced every 20-25 samples. Clarified 
the correct procedure for performing a calibration check. 
Clarification: Added "before and after" to the 0.080 and 
0.200 calibration checks, within 24 hours of a subject test. 
The official time and date of the calibration check is the 
time and date recorded on the printout, or the time and date 
recorded in the log, whichever corresponds to the calibration 
check referenced in section 2.1.3 or 2.1.4.1. 
August 1, 1999 
August I, 1999 
January 29, 2001 
August 18, 2006 
November 27, 2006 
May 14, 2007 
May 14, 2007 
September 18, 2007 
February 13, 2008 
February 13, 2008 
February 13, 2008 
February 13, 2008 
February 13, 2008 
December 1, 2008 
January 14, 2009 
July 7, 2009 
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History Page 
Revision# Effective date 
0 8/20/2010 
History 
The entire SOP was rewritten to incorporate language changes regarding 
performance verifications, and to clear-up ambiguities associated with 
the 0.20 verification and the relevance to cases not involving an 18-
8004c charge. Scope and safety sections were added. Troubleshooting, 
MIP/MIC sections added. 
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Quantitative Analysis for Alcohol in Breath by Approved Breath Testing 
Instruments 
Contents: 
Section 2: Scope 
Section 3: Safety 
Section 4: Instrument and Operator Certification 
Section 5: Performance Verification of Approved Breath Testing Instruments 
Section 6: Evidentiary Testing Procedure 
page 7 
page 7 
page7 
page 10 
page 13 
Section 7: Troubleshooting 
Section 8: MIP/MIC Procedure 
page 15 
page 16 
Idaho Breath Alcohol Standard Operating Procedure 
Issuing Authority---ISPFS Quality Manager 
Revision O Effective 8/20/2010 
1 
2 
Quantitative Analysis for Alcohol in Breath by Approved 
Breath Testing Instruments. 
Scope 
This method describes the Idaho State Police Forensic Services (ISPFS) 
procedure, for use by agencies external to ISPFS, for the analysis of breath for the 
presence of volatile compounds using an approved breath testing instrument. This 
method provides for the quantitative analysis of ethanol. 
Following all the recommendations of this external procedure will establish the 
scientific validity and set the unquestioned foundational admissibility of the breath 
alcohol test. Failure to meet all of the recommendations within this procedure does not 
disqualify the breath alcohol test, but does allow for the questioning of the breath alcohol 
tests as it pertains to its foundation of admissibility in court. That foundation can be set, 
through testimony, by a breath testing specialist expert or ISPFS expert in breath testing 
as to the potential ramifications of the deviation from the procedure as stated. 
3 Safety 
Within the discipline of breath alcohol testing, the general biohazard safety 
precaustions should be followed. This is due to the potential infectious materials that 
may be ejected from the mouth during the sampling of the breath. Caution should be 
taken so as the expired breath is not directed towards the officer or other unrelated 
bystander. · 
4 Instrument and Operator Certification 
To ensure that minimum standards are met, individual breath testing instruments, 
operators, and breath testing specialists (BTS) must be approved and certified by the 
Idaho State Police Forensic Services (ISPFS). The ISPFS will establish and maintain a 
list of approved instruments by manufacturer brand or model designation for use in the 
state. 
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4.1 Approval of Breath Testing Instruments. In order to be approved and certified 
each instrument must meet the following criteria: 
4.1.1 The instrument shall analyze a reference sample or analytical test standard, 
the results of which must agree within +/- 10% of the target value or such 
limits set by ISPFS. 
4. 1.2 The certification procedures shall be adequate and appropriate for the 
analyses of breath specimens for the determination of alcohol 
concentration for law enforcement. 
4.1.3 Any other tests deemed necessary to correctly and adequately evaluate the 
instrument to give accurate results in routine breath alcohol testing. 
4.2 The ISPFS may, for cause, remove a specific instrument by serial number from 
evidential testing and suspend or withdraw certification thereof. 
4.3 Operators become certified by completing a training class taught by an ISPFS 
certified Breath Testing Specialist (BTS). Certification is for 26 calendar months 
and expires the last day of the 26th month. Certification will allow the operator to 
perform all functions required to obtain a valid breath alcohol test. It is the 
responsibility of the individual operator to maintain their current certification; the 
ISPFS will not notify operators that their certification is about to expire. 
4.3.1 Recertification for another 26-month period is achieved by completing an 
ISPFS approved Operator class prior to the end of the 26th month. 
4.3.2 If the individual fails to satisfactorily complete the class (including the 
written and practical tests), or allows their certification status to expire, 
he/she must retake the operator class in order to become re-certified. 
4.3.3 If current Operator certification is voided, the individual is not certified to 
run evidentiary breath alcohol tests on the instrument in question until the 
operator class is completed. 
4.3.3.1 There are no grace periods or provisions for extension of operator 
certification. 
4.4 Breath Testing Specialists (BTS) are Operators who have completed an 
advanced training class and are ISPFS-certified to perform instrument 
maintenance, and provide both initial and recertification training for instrument 
operators. 
4.4.1 To obtain initial BTS certification, an individual must be currently 
certified as an Operator of that particular instrument. BTS certification is 
then obtained by completing an approved BTS training class. 
4.4.2 Certification is valid for 26 calendar months. 
Idaho Breath Alcohol Standard Operating Procedure 
Issuing Authority---ISPFS Quality Manager 
Revision 0 Effective 8/20/2010 
p,,.,,.., !1 nf17 
4.4.3 If BTS certification is allowed to expire, the individual reverts to certified 
Operator status for 12 calendar months for that instrument. He/she may 
no longer perform any BTS specific duties relating to that particular 
instrument. 
4.4.4 BTS certification is renewable by attending an approved BTS training 
class. 
4.4.5 The Idaho State Police Forensic Services may revoke BTS certification for 
cause. Examples may include falsification of records, failure to perform 
required performance verification, failure to successfully pass a BTS re-
certification class and failure to meet standards in conducting operator 
training. 
4.5 Adoption of a new instrument by an agency will require updating any BTS and 
Operators in that agency in the use of the new instrument. 
4.5.1 A currently certified BTS may become a certified BTS for a new 
instrument by completing an ISPFS approved BTS Instrumentation class. 
4.5.2 A currently certified Operator may certify on a new instrument by 
completing an ISPFS approved Operator Instrumentation Class for the 
new instrument. 
4.5.3 Individuals not currently certified as Operators must complete an 
Operator Class for each approved instrument. 
4.6 Record maintenance and management. It is the responsibility of each 
individual agency to store performance verification records, subject records, 
maintenance records, instrument logs, or any other records as p~rtaining to the 
evidentiary use of breath testing instruments and to maintain a current record of 
operator certification. 
4.6.1 It is the responsibility of the agency to see that the said records are stored 
and maintained a minimum of (3) years in accordance with IDAP A 
11.03.01. 
4.6.1.1 Records may be subject to periodic review by the Idaho State 
Police Forensic Services. 
4.6.2 The Idaho State Police Forensic Services will not be responsible for the 
storage of such records not generated by ISPFS. 
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5. Performance Verification of Breath Testing Instruments 
Performance verifications aid the Breath Testing Specialist (BTS) and the Idaho State 
Police Forensic Services (ISPFS) in determining if a breath testing instrument is 
functioning correctly. Perfonnance verifications are performed using a wet bath 
simulator performance verification solution. The solution is provided by and/or approved 
by ISPFS. The ISPFS analysis establishes the target value and acceptable range of the 
solutions used for the verification and includes the acceptable values on the Certificate of 
Analysis for each solution. Note: The ISP established target values may be different 
from those shown on the bottle label. 
5.1 Alco-Sensor and Lifeloc FC20 - Portable Breath Testing Instrument 
Performance Verification 
5.1.I The Alco-Sensor and Lifeloc FC20 portable breath testing instrument 
performance verification is run using approximately 0.08 and/or 0.20 
performance verification solutions provided by and/or approved by ISPFS. 
5.1.2 The performance verification using the 0.08 and 0.20 perfonnance 
verification solutions consist of two samples separated by air blanks. 
5.1.3 A performance verification of the Alco-Sensor and Lifeloc FC20 
instruments using a 0.08 performance verification solution must be 
performed within 24 hours, before or after an evidentiary test to be 
approved for evidentiary use. Multiple breath alcohol tests may be 
covered by a single performance verification. 
5.1.3.1 A 0.08 performance verification solution should be replaced with 
fresh solution approximately every 25 verifications or every 
calendar month, whichever comes first. 
5.1.4 A 0.20 performance verification should be run and results logged once per 
calendar month and replaced with fresh solution approximately every 25 
verifications. 
NOTE: The 0.020 performance verification was implemented for the sole 
purpose of supporting the instruments results for an 18-8004c charge. In 
the absence of an I 8-8004c charge, the 0.20 verifications, or lack thereof~ 
shall have no relevance to the results or the evidentiary value of the 
evidentiary test. 
5.1 .4.1 The 0.20 performance verification satisfies the requirement for 
performance verification within 24 hours, before or after an 
evidentiary test. The 0.20 performance verification solution should 
not be used routinely for this purpose. 
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5.1.5 Acceptable results for a 0.080 or 0.20 performance verification is a pair of 
samples in sequence that are both within +/- I 0% of the performance 
verification solution target value. Target values and ranges of acceptable 
results are included in a certificate of analysis for each solution lot series, 
prepared by, and available from, the ISPFS. 
NOTE: Due to external factors associated with changing a 
performance verification solution ( examples include: ambient air 
in the sample chamber, temperature fluctuation) the results of the 
initial performance verification may not be within the acceptable 
range, therefore the performance verification may be repeated until 
a pair of satisfactory results are obtained. However, if results after 
a total of three runs for any solution (equivalent to six tests) are 
still unsatisfactory, contact the appropriate ISPFS Laboratory. The 
instrument should not be used for evidentiary testing until the 
problem is corrected and performance verification results are 
within the acceptable range. The suggested troubleshooting 
procedure should be followed if the initial performance verification 
does not meet the acceptance criteria. 
5.1.6 Temperature of the simulator must be between 33.5°C and 34.5°C in order 
for the performance verification results to be valid. 
NOTE: The simulator may need to warm for approximately 15 minutes to 
insure that the metal lid is also warm. If the lid is cold, condensation of 
alcohol vapor may occur producing low results. 
5.1.7 Performance verification solutions should only be used prior to the 
expiration date on the label. 
5.1.8 An agency may run additional performance verification solution levels at 
their discretion. 
5.1.9 The official time and date of the performance verification is the time and 
date recorded on the printout, or the time and date recorded in the log, 
whichever corresponds to the performance verification referenced in 
section 5.1.3 or 5.1.4.1. 
5.2 Intoxilyzer 5000/EN Performance Verification 
Intoxilyzer 5000/EN instruments must have a performance verification with each 
evidentiary test. If the performance verification is within the acceptable range for 
the lot of solution being used, then the instrument will be approved and the 
resulting breath samples will be deemed valid for evidentiary use. 
5.2.1 Intoxilyzer 5000/EN performance verification is run using 0.08 and/or 
0.20 performance verification solutions provided by and/or approved by 
ISPFS. 
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5.2.2 During each evidentiary breath alcohol test using the Intoxilyzer 5000/EN, 
a performance verification will be perf onned as directed by the instrument 
testing sequence and recorded as SIM CHK on the printout. If the SIM 
CHK is not within the acceptable range for the solution lot being used, the 
testing sequence will abort and no breath samples will be obtained. 
5.2.3 A two sample perfonnance verification using a 0.08 performance 
verification solution should be run and results logged each time a 
solution is replaced with fresh solution. A 0.08 perfonnance verification 
solution should be replaced with fresh solution approximately every 100 
samples or every calendar month, whichever comes first. 
5.2.4 A two sample performance verification using a 0.20 performance 
verification solution should be run and results logged once per calendar 
month and replaced with fresh solution approximately every 25 samples. 
The same bottle of 0.20 solution may be used for several months. 
NOTE: The 0.020 perfonnance verification was implemented for 
the sole purpose of supporting the instruments results for a 18-
8,004c charge. In the absence of an 18-8004c charge, the 0.20 
verification, or lack thereof, shall have no relevance to the results 
or the evidentiary value of the evidentiary test. 
5.2.5 Acceptable results for a 0.080 or 0.20 perfonnance verification is a pair of 
samples in sequence that are both within +/- 10% of the performance 
verification solution target value. Target values and ranges of acceptable 
results for each solution lot series are included in a certificate of analysis, 
prepared by, and available from, the ISPFS. 
NOTE: Due to external factors associated with changing a 
perfonnance verification solution ( examples include: ambient air 
in the sample chamber, temperature fluctuation) the results of the 
initial performance verification may not be within the acceptable 
range, therefore the perfonnance verification may be repeated until 
a pair of satisfactory results are obtained however, if results after a 
total of three runs for any solution ( equivalent to six tests) are still 
unsatisfactory, contact the appropriate ISPFS Laboratory. The 
instrument should not be used for evidentiary testing until the 
problem is corrected and perfonnance verification results are 
within the acceptable range. Follow the suggested troubleshooting 
procedure if the initial performance verification does not meet the 
acceptance criteria. 
5.2.6 The official time and date of the performance verification is the time and 
date recorded on the printout, or the time and date recorded in the log. 
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5.2.7 Performance verification solutions should only be used prior to the 
expiration date as marked on the label. 
5.2.8 Temperature of the simulator must be between 33.5°C and 34.5°C in order 
for the performance verification results to be valid. 
5.2.9 An agency may run additional performance verification solution levels at 
their discretion. 
5.2.10 The BTS must set the correct acceptable range limits and performance 
verification solution lot number in the instrument before proceeding with 
evidentiary testing. 
6. Evidentiary Testing Procedure 
Proper testing procedure by certified operators is necessary in order to provide accurate 
results that will be admissible in court. Instruments used in Idaho measure alcohol in the 
breath, not the blood, and report results as grams of alcohol in 210 liters of breath. 
6.1 Prior to evidential breath alcohol testing, the subject/individual should be 
monitored for at least fifteen (15) minutes. Any material which absorbs/adsorbs 
or traps alcohol should be removed from the mouth prior to the start of the 15 
minute waiting period. During the monitoring period the subject/individual should 
not be allowed to smoke, drink, eat, or belch/burp/vomit/regurgitate. 
NOTE: If a foreign object/material is left in the mouth during the entirety of the 
15 minute monitoring period, any potential external alcohol contamination will 
come into equilibrium with the subject/individual's body water and/or dissipate so 
as not to interfere with the results of the subsequent breath alcohol test. 
6.1.1 The breath alcohol test must be administered by an operator currently 
certified in the use of the instrument used. 
6.1.2 False teeth, partial plates, or bridges installed or prescribed by a dentist or 
physician do not need to be removed to obtain a valid test. 
6.1.3 The operator may elect a blood test in place of the breath alcohol test if 
there is a failure to complete the fifteen minute monitoring period 
successfully. 
6.1.4 During the monitoring period, the operator must be alert for any event that 
might influence the accuracy of the breath alcohol test. 
6.1.4.1 The operator must be aware of the possible presence of mouth 
alcohol as indicated by the testing instrument. If mouth alcohol is 
suspected or indicated, the operator should begin another 15-
minute waiting period before repeating the testing sequence. 
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6.1.4.2 If, during the 15-minute waiting period, the subject/individual 
vomits or regurgitates material from the stomach into the 
subject/individual's breath pathway, the 15-minute waiting period 
must begin again. 
6.1.4.3 If there is doubt as to the events occurring during the 15 minute 
monitoring period, the officer should look at results of the 
duplicate breath samples for evidence of potential alcohol 
contamination. For clarification see section 6.2.2.2. 
6.2 A complete breath alcohol test includes two (2) valid breath samples taken 
during the testing sequence and preceded by air blanks. The duplicate breath 
samples should be approximately 2 minutes apart to allow for the dissipation of 
potential mouth alcohol contamination. 
NOTE:· A deficient or insufficient sample does not automatically 
invalidate a test sample. 
6.2.1 If the subject/individual fails or refuses to provide a second or third 
adequate sample as requested by the operator, the single test result may be 
considered valid. 
6.2.1.1 The operator may repeat the testing sequence as required by 
circumstances. 
6.2.1.2 The operator should use a new mouthpiece for each series of tests. 
6.2.2 A third breath sample is required if the first two results differ by more than 
0.02. 
6.2.2.1 Unless mouth alcohol is indicated or suspected, it is not necessary 
to repeat the 15-minute waiting period to obtain a third breath 
sample. 
6.2.2.2 The results for a duplicate breath samples should correlate within 
0.02 to indicate the absence of alcohol contamination in the 
subject/individual's breath pathway, show consistent sample 
delivery, and indicates the absence of RFI as a contributing factor 
to the breath results. 
6.2.3 The operator should log test results and retain printouts for possible use in 
court. The log of the results or the instrument printouts can be used as the 
official legal record for court purposes. 
6.2.4 If a subject/individual fails or refuses to provide a second or third sample 
as requested by the operator, the results obtained are still considered valid 
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by the ISPFS, provided the failure to supply the requested samples was 
the fault of the subject/individual and not the operator. 
6.2.5 If the second or third samples are lacking due to instrument failure, the 
operator should attempt to utilize another instrument or have blood drawn. 
7. Troubleshooting Procedure 
Proper testing procedure by certified operators is necessary in order to provide accurate 
results that will be admissible in court. Instruments used in Idaho measure alcohol in the 
breath, not the blood, and report results as grams of alcohol in 210 liters of breath. 
7.1 Performance verification: If, when performing the periodic performance 
verification, the instrument falls outside the limits of the verification, the 
troubleshooting guide should be used. 
NOTE: This is a guide for troubleshooting failed performance 
verifications and the procedure is recommended to streamline and isolate 
the potential cause of the problem. Strict adherence to the guidelines is 
not required. 
7 .1.1 The three sources of error when performing the periodic performance 
verifications are in the simulator setup and operator technique, the 
simulator performance verification solution, and the instrument calibration 
itself. 
7 .1.2 If the first performance verification fails, the simulator setup and 
technique of the operator performing the verification should be evaluated. 
The simulator should be evaluated to ensure that it is hooked up properly, 
uses short hoses, is properly warmed, is within temperature, the operator 
blow technique is not too hard or soft, and that the operator does not stop 
blowing until after the sample is taken. 
7 .1.2.1 The performance verification should be run a second time 
7.1.2.2 If the performance verification passes on the second try, the 
instrument passes the performance verification. 
7.1.3 If the second performance verification fails, then the performance 
verification solution should be evaluated. 
7.1.3.1 The performance verification solution should be changed to a fresh 
solution. 
7.1.3.2 The solution should be warmed for approximately 15 minutes, or 
until the temperature is within range, and the simulator lid is as 
warm as the simulator jar. 
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7.1.3.3 The performance verification may then be repeated. 
7 .1 .4 If the third performance verification fails, then the only remaining source 
of error lies with the instrument itself. At this point the instrument must 
be taken out of service and sent to ISPFS or an approved service provider. 
7.1.5 Upon return from service, the instrument should be evaluated by ISPFS 
before being put back into service. 
7.2 Thermometers: 
7 .2.1 If a bubble forms in the thermometer, the operator or BTS can place the 
thermometer in a freezer to draw the mercury (or equivalent) into the bulb of the 
thermometer. This should disperse the bubble. 
8. MIP/MIC Procedure 
Since the testing threshold (presence or absence) for a minor in possession/minor in 
consumption charge is different from an 18-8004 charge and the numeric thresholds, 
there is a different procedure associated with these special circumstances. In many 
instances, an underage drinking party may consist of multiple subjects/individuals that 
need to be tested and the sheer number of individuals does not lend itself to observing a 
15 minute waiting period for each person. The potential for "mouth alcohol" is still a 
factor and should be addressed in the testing sequence. 
8.1 15 minute observation period: At the officer's discretion, or as the circumstances 
dictate, the regular DUI procedure (Section 6) may be followed in order to obtain 
a breath sample from the subject/individual. Otherwise, a shortened procedure 
can be followed 
8.2 MIP/MIC procedure: 
8.2.1 The breath alcohol test must be administered by an operator currently 
certified in the use of the instrument used. 
8.2.2 False teeth, partial plates, or bridges installed or prescribed by a dentist or 
physician do not need to be removed to obtain a valid test. 
8.3 A complete breath alcohol test includes two (2) valid breath samples taken 
during the testing sequence and preceded by air blanks. The duplicate breath 
samples should be approximately 2 minutes apart to allow for the dissipation of 
potential mouth alcohol contamination. 
NOTE: A deficient or insufficient sample does not automatically 
invalidate a test sample. 
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8.3.1 If the subject/individual fails or refuses to provide a second or third 
adequate sample as requested by the operator, the single test result may be 
considered valid. 
8.3.1.1 The operator may repeat the testing sequence as required by 
circumstances. 
8.3.1.2 The operator should use a new mouthpiece for each series of tests. 
8.3.2 A third breath sample is required if the first two results differ by more than 
0.02. 
8.3.2.1 The results for a duplicate breath samples should correlate within 
0.02 to indicate the absence of alcohol contamination in the 
subject/individuals breath pathway, show consistent sample 
delivery, and indicates the absence of RFI as a contributing factor 
to the breath results. 
8.3.3 The operator should log test results and retain printouts for possible use in 
court. The log of the results or the instrument printouts can be used as the 
official legal record for court purposes. 
8.3.4 If a subject/individual fails or refuses to provide a second or third sample 
as requested by the operator, the results obtained are still considered valid 
by the ISPFS, provided the failure to supply the requested samples was 
the fault of the subject/individual and not the operator. 
8.3.5 If the second or third samples are lacking due to instrument failure, the 
operator should attempt to utilize another instrument or have blood drawn. 
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